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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
FRENCH MUSLIM YOUTH’S PERCEPTION OF THEIR CULTURAL
IDENTITY IN A POST-CHARLIE HEBDO REALITY IN
THE 19TH ARRONDISSEMENT

by
Gaëlle Bernard
Florida International University, 2021
Miami, Florida
Professor Eric Dwyer, Major Professor
On January 7, 2015, the headquarters of Charlie Hebdo, a satirical newspaper
in France, was attacked by two armed men, Chérif and Saïd Kouachi, who shot and
killed 12 staff members and injured another 11. The motive of the gunmen was the
defense of their Muslim religion, in response to the newspaper’s history of
publishing caricatures of the prophet Mohammed (AFP, 2015). This terrorist attack
of January 7, 2015 continues to have a lasting impact on the lives of French people,
most particularly French Muslims.
The purpose of this case study was to investigate the negotiation of Muslim
youth identity in a post-Charlie Hebdo reality in the 19th arrondissement. This
qualitative study also examined the effect of the attacks on educational policies.
Research questions included 1) How do Muslim youth construct their cultural
identity? 2) What is the impact of laïcité in the construction of Muslim youth
identity? 3) How did the terrorist attacks impact Muslims’ lived experiences? And
4) How do the terrorist attacks impact educational policies? The present study was
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guided by a postcolonial and critical race theory lens. This qualitative study included
eight participants purposely selected from the 19th arrondissement of Paris. Data
were gathered from semi-structured interviews and document analysis.
Findings revealed the importance of both the French identity and the parents’
ethnic and religious background in the formation of the participants’ identity.
Participants also expressed a sense of not totally belonging in either cultures as they
experienced a process of otherization in France but also in their parents’ homeland.
Findings also showed how laïcité instead of being a process of acculturation is a
process of assimilation. Findings showed that documents and tools provided by the
government are constructed around assimilationist ideologies and problematic views
of Islam and Muslim youth, further marginalizing the Muslim community.
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PREFACE
Nos ancêtres les Gaulois1
As far as I can remember, I was always a studious and hardworking student.
I would sit in the front row so that I could see the blackboard better, eagerly listening
to my teacher.
During a history lesson in fourth grade, our teacher taught us about our
ancestors, the Gauls. I looked with puzzlement at the pictures he showed us. How
could the Gauls be my ancestors? My skin was brown. They had red hair and
freckles. That day I came home and told my mother about this inconceivable fact. To
my surprise, she replied that she too had been taught that her ancestors were the
Gauls. I was surprised because I knew my mother went to school in Guadeloupe.
Guadeloupe is now a French overseas state located in the Lesser Antilles in the
Caribbean. The population is mainly composed of the descendants of African slaves.
I could not understand for the sake of me how we were descendants of the Gauls.
However, l’école de la République Française [the French Republican School]
assured me that it was a certain fact. From that moment I became a different person.
Even though I was still the same studious student who never really questioned my
teachers after all they had the knowledge, I began wondering about knowledge.
L’école de la République
“Look at them! Are you sure you want to teach them? It is a colorful class that
you have.”
“Yes, I love it. Maybe I can teach them something.”

1

Our ancestors the Gauls.
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My sixth-grade teacher Mrs LeGoff proudly recounted to us the conversation
that took place when she showed our class picture to her upper-class family. Her
parents obviously seemed concerned that their daughter was teaching in an urban
school with such wide diversity. I remember feeling angry when she told us what she
felt was a big accomplishment. I felt like a guinea pig, an experiment to a young
teacher who wanted the thrill to teach a colorful class as if we were that different from
other children. I was young maybe 12 or 13, but I already had this feeling of anger
and injustice building up. School was supposed to be the place of upward mobility
where we had a chance to be treated equally. “Liberté, égalité, fraternité!” [Liberty,
equality, fraternity!] they said. But my experiences would say otherwise.
“If you don’t understand French, go back to China,” shouted our French
Language Arts teacher to Richard as he struggled to find the correct answer. As soon
as she said that she probably regretted her words as a buzzing sound of anger spread
throughout the class. “What did you just say? I was born in Paris!” shouted Richard as
he flipped over the table in anger. The chaos that followed that altercation was
indescribable. I was the class president, so the teacher, now fearing a complete lack of
safety, sent me running to get the school counselor. Instead, the school principal came
running, screaming commands to stop immediately. My responsibility as class
president was to explain the situation. Despite the obvious inappropriateness of the
teacher’s comment, the principal felt that the class should be punished for responding
in an inappropriate manner, and we were given detention for weeks. The teacher took
a month of paid vacation.
Afterwards, our class was deemed as the most disruptive class in the whole
middle school, which entitled teachers to make derogatory comments, knowing that
we would be blamed for anything that would result from those comments. Our
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origins, referring to both our races and our neighborhood, would become labels
defining us, following us, haunting us, and explaining our inability to successfully
integrate into French society.
“I want to become a TV host for the national channel,” I said with assurance
as the career counselor asked me what I wanted to do. He looked at me with sympathy
and told me that as a black woman I would never be able to be a TV host for the
national channel. I would be most likely to succeed in secretarial work or as a nurse’s
aide, not even a nurse. Therefore, he advised me to attend a vocational school. In
France, minorities (except for Asian minorities), regardless of their academic
achievement, are often advised to pursue a less academic path. Thankfully, my mother
opposed the decision, and I was able to join a language program in a traditional
school.
College Experiences
“There was nothing in Africa before Europeans came and certainly not
democracy,” replied my professor of British history. I was in a French university,
and I had approached my professor regarding the possible topic of my thesis for the
completion of my master’s degree. I had just come back from a wonderful year
abroad in an American university, where I had learned the most amazing facts about
African societies. During that year, our Black History professor taught us history like
I have never been taught before. I became fascinated with Africa and more
specifically with Ancient Africa. For that reason, I wanted to focus on the kingdoms
of Ancient Africa and their democratic systems for my thesis. When I came back to
France, I was confident that my professor would approve my topic and help me to
investigate the issue. However, her answer felt like a cold shower. As she proceeded
to explain to me that there was nothing in Africa before colonization except some
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unruly tribes, she called another professor to support her argument. When she told
him my topic, he looked at me and laughed and said with a condescending attitude,
“But dear, there was nothing before colonization and certainly not democratic
systems.” He suggested that I explore colonial or post-colonial Africa instead. Right
there, I decided that this master’s program was not for me anymore and that I would
finish the year and explore new possibilities.
Those different experiences did have a crucial impact on my schooling and
the choice of my career. I decided that I wanted to pursue a career in teaching and
become an educator who could make a positive impact.
Personal connection
Before moving to the United States to pursue my doctoral degree I lived in
Paris’s 19th arrondissement with my mother and my brother. My connection to the
Kouachi brothers was personal. I had family living in the same neighborhood: my
grandmother’s cousin.
My cousin is around my age. He converted to Islam at a young age. He had
lived all his life in that neighborhood and knew everybody. Most particularly, he
knew Chérif and Saïd Kouachi, the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks of the Charlie
Hebdo headquarters in January 2015. He first met Chérif when he was around
11 years old. Even though the Kouachi brothers lived in another part of town they
would often hang around our neighborhood.
He remembers Chérif as a nice young man who was often in the street and did
not have too much schooling. He never knew him as a violent person capable of such
a terrible act. He remembers Chérif as wanting to become a rapper, which was not
uncommon among young people living in rough neighborhoods in France. Hip-hop
was a way to express one’s frustration and a possible escape from one’s bleak fate. He
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also saw him five months before the attack at the youth center playing PlayStation. He
was so quiet and looked like any normal young person—not a future kamikaze. My
cousin could have never imagined what was in the making.
The day of the attack, my cousin was looking at the television, watching in
awe the events unfolding. When he saw that the terrorists were from the cell La filière
des Buttes Chaumont (Buttes Chaumont network), or more commonly known in the
neighborhood as la rue de Meaux (a street in our neighborhood, which is known for
being a terrorist cell), he immediately thought it was one of the older members of the
cell, not the Kouachi brothers.
However, he later received a message on Facebook from a friend, telling him
that Chérif and his brothers were the terrorists who committed the attacks. My cousin
was shocked because he knew Chérif. Still, at the same time, he was not so shocked
because it was Chérif and his path toward jihadism was an indication of his views.
My interest in the topic of cultural identity among French youth discussed in
the proposed dissertation study surfaced after the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks of
January 2015 in Paris. I first discussed this topic informally with my friends, who like
me were a product of a French education. We had been taught by the Republican
School. Our story never told, our backgrounds erased, being taught how to be French.
Thus, we could relate to the topic as we personally understood the ramifications of a
French education, dissecting the events trying to understand the how and the why and
what could be done to prevent the killing of innocents in the name of religion. The
need to investigate the subject matter at hand became a necessity after the second
terrorist attacks in November 2015, with a death casualty of 130 it impacted the
country even more than the first attack.
Both attacks had a terrible and deep impact on me.
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Hearing such a personal perspective from my cousin on the subject compelled
me to want to know more and investigate the subject matter at hand.
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TIMELINE OF EVENTS

● The French Revolution (1789). It signified the end of the monarchy and the
establishment of a secular and democratic republic achieved through a bloody
uprising of the French people.
● Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1790. This statute aimed to establish a
church subordinated to the State rather than the Pope.
● Concordat of 1801. Acknowledged the Catholic faith as the religion of the
great majority of French people.
● Law of 1905. Marked the absolute separation of the Church and State
● Algerian War. The war between France and the Algerian National Liberation
Front that led to the independence of Algeria in 1962.
● Arab Spring began with the Tunisian Revolution in December 2010 and
spread to other countries in North Africa and the Middle East.
● Charlie Hebdo attacks. On January 7, 2015 Chérif and Said Kouachi shot and
killed 12 staff members of the satirical Newspaper Charlie Hebdo and injured
another 11.
● November 13 terrorist attacks, A series of coordinated terrorist attacks, which
occurred on November 13, 2015 in Paris and its suburbs. 130 people were
killed that day and more than 300 people were injured.
● September 2020. Two people were injured near the Charlie Hebdo former
offices amid the trial of the suspects of the January 2015 attacks.
● October 2020. Samuel Paty a middle school history teacher is beheaded after
showing Charlie Hebdo's 2012 cartoons depicting the Islamic prophet
Muhammad.
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Burkini: Aheda Zanetti, an Australian Muslim woman, created the burkini a
combination of the word burqa and bikini (Taylor, 2016). It is a modesty swimsuit for
women covering the head and the body.
Century of Enlightenment: A philosophical and intellectual movement that took
place in Europe in the 18th century.
Djellabas: A loose hooded cloak traditionally worn by Arabs.
Enseignement de langue et la culture d’origine (ELCO): Bilateral agreements
taken in 1977 by the European communities and 9 countries (Algeria, Spain, Croatia,
Tunisia, Italy, Morocco, Serbia, Turkey, and Portugal) to facilitate the assimilation the
children of immigrant workers. The native language as well as the culture of the
country of birth should be taught to children (Eduscol, 2016).
Filière des Buttes Chaumont (filière irakienne du 19e arrondissement): A jihadi
network created in the 19th arrondissement with the intent to send jihadists to the Iraq
war.
Français de souche: It refers to a person born from French parents’ centuries after
centuries. This term is often used among French politicians and the media (Duval,
2015).
Frenchness: What does it mean to be French? That is a question the Minister of
National Identity, Eric Besson, wanted answered in 2009 through a national debate.
Fiche S: The fiche S, S standing for Sûreté de l’État2, is a document assigned to
individuals who are considered to pose a risk to the national security. People
suspected of plotting terrorist attacks, political protesters as well as just knowing a

2

State Security

8

person who is suspected of being a terrorist could be assigned a fiche S. People who
have a fiche S may not have done anything illegal and yet still have a fiche S
(Sandford, 2018).
Groupe Salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC): An Algerian terrorist
faction created in 1998, which later became Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
Harkis: Native Muslim Algerians who fought alongside France (Clancy-Smith,
2017).
Je suis Charlie: A slogan created by Joachim Roncin and later adopted by people
who supported freedom of speech and stood against the murders of the journalists.
Je ne suis pas Charlie: A counter slogan to express one's disagreements with the
Satirist journal pointing out its racism.
Jihadi: A person who participates in the jihad.
Laïcité: Secularism is a fundamental concept in the French constitution separating
Churches and State.
Liberté d’expression: Freedom of Speech.
19th arrondissement: One of the 20 arrondissements (districts) in Paris and where
the Kouachi brothers lived most of their life. It has a large immigrant population.
Republican March: The Republican March was organized on January 10th and 11th
to protest the terrorist attacks of January 7th.
Republican School: After the laws passed by Jules Ferry in 1881, 1882, and 1886, a
free, secular, and mandatory public school was created for all to attend. The
Republican School is highly centralized. All decisions making regarding education is
made by the government, aiming to offer the same instruction to its students.
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Salafi: An ultra-conservative branch of the Sunni Islam. Wagemakers (2016) states
“Salafis claim that their ideas and teachings amount to nothing more or less than
Islam in all its purity.” (p. 2)
Verlan: A slang commonly used among the Youth in France. Lefkowitch (1989)
noted, “Verlan as a spoken phenomenon originates in the working class, immigrantpopulated northern suburbs of Paris known as La Zone” (p. 313).
Vivre ensemble: The concept of living together in harmony despite religious or
ethnic differences.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
There are so many other labels people like to assign. Where am I an insider
and where am I an outsider? It all depends on where I'm standing and who is trying
to put me
into which box.
— Eowyn Ivey, 2016

On January 7, 2015, the headquarters of Charlie Hebdo, a satirical newspaper
in France, was attacked by two armed men, Chérif and Said Kouachi who shot and
killed 12 staff members and injured another 11. The motive of the gunmen was the
defense of their Muslim religion, based on the newspaper’s history of publishing
caricatures of the prophet Mohammed (AFP, 2015). Some interpretations of Islam
forbid any representation of the image of the prophet (AFP, 2007). The world’s
interpretation of the motive of the gunmen was Islamic fundamentalism resulting in
an act of terrorism. Welch and Perivolaris (2016) observed, “At the same time, while
their targets had specific resonance in a French context, the terrorists made explicit
reference to horizons beyond France by asserting their allegiance with the
international jihadi struggle. It soon emerged that the Kouachi brothers had longstanding connections with the transnational networks of radical Islamism” (p. 208).
The terrorist attack of January 7, 2015 continues to have a lasting impact on the lives
of French people, most particularly French Muslims. Muslims are constantly the
target of violent political diatribes. France “struggle[s] to incorporate Muslim
communities into secular societies whose values are often at odds with Islamic beliefs
and whose members are often hostile to their presence” (Read, 2007, p. 231).
Globally the political instrumentation of Islam further reinforces the idea that Islam is
incompatible with the values of western democracies.
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The incorporation of Muslim communities into secular France poses a
significant problem in education as the faith of Muslim students is viewed as being
incompatible with secularism at school. Therefore, Muslim students should erase any
visible signs of affiliation to said religion.
On October 11, 2019, Julien Odoul, an elected official, said about a school
chaperone, “In the name of our republican and secular principles, I asked Marie-Guite
Dufay [PS3 president of the region] to remove the Islamic veil from a school
chaperone present in the hemicycle” (L’Express, 2019). Those types of outbursts
further contribute to the disenfranchisement of Muslims and carry well over into the
Republican schools and the treatment of Muslim students. Their religious affiliation
further stigmatized them, and teachers often see them as others who need to be
integrated into French society even though they were born into French society.
The terrorists touched a sacred principle of the Republic of France, that of
liberté d’expression [freedom of speech]. “Je suis Charlie” [I am Charlie] then
echoed throughout the world. Joachim Roncin, the French Art director for the
magazine Stylist, created the picture and posted it on Twitter to express his sadness
after the attacks (Provost, 2015). Many countries showed solidarity with the French
nation with rallies and vigils being held in cities around the world under the banner of
“Je suis Charlie.” Most notably, on January 11, 2015, the Republican March,
organized by the leadership of the French Republic, gathered an estimated 1.5 million
marchers, including many world leaders such as David Cameron, then Prime Minister
of England, and Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany (Lichfield, 2015; Wilsher,
2015).

3

PS refers to the “Partie Socialiste” or Socialist Party, one of the major political parties in France.
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However, dissident voices also arose. The mantra “Je ne suis pas Charlie”
[I am not Charlie] arose to protest the specter of a double standard with respect to
freedom of speech in France. Smyrnaios and Ratinaud (2017) conducted research on
tweets following the Charlie Hebdo attacks, finding “that smaller, highly politicized,
and polarized groups had similar attitudes toward the events: they were less engaged
immediately after the attacks in emotional expression of sympathy and shock, but
they participated vividly in the following days in polemical discussions or engaged
themes” (p. 1). Twitter user Aboujahjah (2015), a Lebanese writer living in Brussels,
tweeted:
I am not Charlie; I am Ahmed the dead cop. Charlie ridiculed my faith and
culture and I died defending his right to do so. #JesuisAhmed” (Twitter
citation, 2015).
Rosenbaum (2015) in her newspaper article titled I am not Charlie Hebdo and you
shouldn’t be either argued “Freedom of speech always has to be balanced against
other freedoms, such as freedom from racial vilification” (paras.2). The cartoons from
Charlie Hebdo indeed may have been perceived as racial slander against a particular
religious group. As a response, those feeling attacked tried to convey different
perspectives on the subject. Badouard explains: “Je Ne Suis Pas Charlie represented a
heterogeneity of voices. [...] Muslim users also emphasized that the terrorists were not
representative of their religion, often citing Quran verses about peace and love” (as
cited in Gigletto and Lee, 2007, p. 12).
Tweeting “Je ne suis pas Charlie” was a way for people to distance
themselves from what Charlie Hebdo represented, a satirical journal which desecrated
Islam. My study aimed at describing and understanding how French Muslim youth
were impacted by those attacks and how they perceived or constructed their identity
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in a post Charlie Hebdo Île de France. In the educational context, Muslim students,
particularly their identity, are viewed as a threat to laïcité, or secularism. Following
the Charlie Hebdo attack, French Muslim students found themselves being treated as
potential terrorists by teachers and school administration. Some students were
criminalized in schools for not respecting the minute of silence for the victims of the
terrorist attacks or for simply stating “I am not Charlie” out loud (Barbouch, 2015;
Gueye, 2015). The decision by the students not to respect the minute of silence was
predicated on the fact that some students like Ahmed felt his religious beliefs were not
respected (Enfant de 8 ans, 2015). Different incidents occurring in different schools
highlight the climate of paranoia and suspicion that took place after the different
terrorist attacks of January 2015. For example, Ayman was 9 years old, when on
January 15, 2015 Ayman and his father Mr. Mathlouthi were called in for questioning
at the police station in Villers-Cotteret. The police officer informed the father that
allegedly Ayman shouted “Allah Akbar” during the minute of silence. Ayman
strongly refuted the allegations and mentioned that two other children did not respect
the minute of silence, but he was not part of the group (Barbouch, 2015; CCIF, 2015).
Ahmed was 8 years old, when on January 28, 2015, Ahmed and his father were
interrogated by the Police in Nice. In a video, Ahmed told his story. On January 8, the
morning after the Charlie Hebdo attacks, Ahmed was asked by his teacher if he was
for or against Charlie. He replied, “I am against Charlie” (CCIF, 2015; Islamotion,
2015). Ahmed’s reasoning was shaped by the disrespect shown to his religion by the
cartoon about Mahomet. A 14-year-old middle school student reported that, on
January 8, 2015, he participated in the minute of silence with his middle school
classmates without any incidents.
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The next day, during a class debate regarding the events, the student raised his
hand and declared that the “terrorists” were right. The following Monday and
Tuesday, the student was called to the principal’s office, where he apologized for his
actions. In the meantime, he was suspended while awaiting the decision of the
disciplinary committee. On Wednesday, the principal still decided to press charges
against the student for expressing his opinion. On Thursday, the student and his
parents were called in for questioning. The teenager was detained for 24 hours in jail.
On January 17, he was presented in front of the judge to be indicted for “apology of
terrorism” (Tourret, 2015; “Apologie d’acte de terrorisme”, 2015).
In all the students’ accounts presented above, it is noteworthy to mention that
the students reported feeling traumatized by the treatment they received (“Apologie”,
2015; Barbouch, 2015; “Un lycéen juge”, 2016). Their voices were left unheard.
Those students did not measure the consequences of their acts. One may reasonably
assume that their negative experiences may impact these students in several ways
going forward. The targeting of these students was expressly the result of their
religious affiliation or their differing views on the attacks. Following the different
incidents that occurred throughout the schools in France, an investigative commission
was mandated to investigate the difficulties encountered by teachers in the schools in
a post Charlie Hebdo France. The next section examines this investigative
commission and its outcome.
Investigative commission post Charlie Hebdo
On January 15, 2015, the centre-right political party, Union for a Popular
Movement (UMP), presented to the Senate a report to create an investigative
commission. The UMP argued the necessity to investigate the role of the Republican
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School and the difficulties encountered by teachers. The UMP mentioned numerous
incidents (around 200, according to the Minister of Education) occurring in different
schools during the minute of silence. (S. Rep. No. 590, 2015). The UMP stated that
teachers’ testimonies reported heinous speech occurring during class debates. It
revealed a discrepancy between some students and the republican moral (S. Rep.
No. 590, 2015). Therefore, it seemed crucial for the UMP party to propose measures
that could help teachers in their mission to transmit the republican values as well as to
investigate the phenomenon of radicalization among French youth. The Senate
approved the investigative commission. The committee was composed of members
from the different political parties to ensure neutrality. The president of the committee
Françoise Laborde is a member of the PRG (Radical party of the Left). The PRG is a
social-liberal political party with opposing views on different topics from the UMP.
The Commission d'enquête sur le fonctionnement du service public de
l'éducation, sur la perte de sur repères républicains que révèle la vie dans les
établissements scolaires et sur les difficultés rencontrées par les enseignants dans
l'exercice de leur profession, a public school committee, held from January 26 to June
29, 2015, emphasized religion as an important issue and a threat to laïcité (the law
prohibiting the veil in school, the debate over proposing a substitute meal when pork
is served for lunch in schools, and different religious celebrations) in the Republican
school, mentioning the minute of silence not being respected, reporting the numerous
incidents following the terrorist attacks and the threats against l’école de la
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république4 [the Republican School] (S. Rep. No. 590, 2015). The UMP recorder
without explicitly mentioning a religion stated, “a denial of nationality from French
youth of a different religious background” (Conge, 2015). One might guess the
different religious background he was referring to. The report denounced an increase
in anti-Semitic feelings since the attacks (S. Rep. No. 590, 2015). The manifestation
of religious signs at school, despite the law of 2004 banning religious signs from
public schools, was noted as problematic. Instead of the veil, Muslim students would
wear outfits such as long dresses or djellabas deemed by the public school officials as
religious but explained as cultural outfits by those wearing them. The report
denounced this circumvention of the law (S. Rep. No. 590, 2015).
The committee published its report on July 1, 2015, suggesting 20 proposals.
Those proposals, far from being novel ideas, found their roots in the Obin report of
2004 regarding religious signs in public schools and the Refondation de l'École
[Reforming the School] law passed in 2013 (Conge, 2015). Some of those proposals
included the following:
1) Sacralization of the Republican Schools by extending the ban of religious
signs by chaperones during field trips.
2) A pact for teachers. They should take an oath to uphold the republican values
when first becoming teachers. They should abide by a moral code and sign the
school’s rules. The report emphasized the fact that teachers were not ordinary
employees; they were state representatives and “They fulfill an eminent moral
magistracy, transmitting values and training the French of tomorrow” (S. Rep.
No. 590, 2015).

4

In France the school system is a centralized one see the section the Republican School for more
details.
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3) Wearing of a uniform, thereby avoiding any religious sign or outfit.
4) Refocusing the program of the history of France and its chronology around the
national narrative (S. Rep. No. 590, 2015). The reports noted that the
instruction of a national history was necessary to reinforce the feeling of
belonging to the French nation. According to Troendle (2015), an UMP
senator, the history taught should be devoid of any guilt and repentance as
French history is one of human progress. Not surprisingly this claim made by
the UMP senator echoes similar claims made by different UMP politicians
such as François Fillon. He stated during his presidential campaign that France
was not guilty for wanting to share its culture with the people of Africa,
America, and Asia, further adding that the instruction of the French history in
schools was only teaching children to be ashamed of their country and history
(Pour François Fillon, 2016).
5) Creation in each French department of a Specialized school for the most
disruptive students.
6) Students’ showing a mastery of French throughout elementary education and
in particular in 5th grade in order to advance to 6th grade. Learning French
would become the focus of primary school curriculum.
7) Elimination of ELCO (teaching of languages and cultures of origin) as a standalone program and its integration into the foreign language learning
curriculum.
8) Better control of the Parliament in terms of choices made in the curriculum
and instruction.
Even though the report is just a report, the president of the committee vowed
to ensure the report would translate into concrete measures, specifically the mastery
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of French, the instruction of laïcité, and a better formation of future teachers (Conge,
2015). It is important to note that the report was not supported by the Left, the
opposing political party, who judged this report to be too old-fashioned (Conge,
2015). The president Françoise Laborde did not vote on the passing of the report,
mentioning that the recorder was a member of the UMP and regretted the manner the
report was written (Conge, 2015).
This report nevertheless shed light on the targeting of Muslim students of Arab
and African descent even though the report specifically mentioned that the incidents
involved a minority of students (S. Rep. No. 590, 2015). As a matter of fact, the
emphasis on 200 incidents (which prompted the report) during a minute of silence
involving 12 million students would seem a bit excessive.
However, the report also highlighted the crucial role of the Republican School
in helping shape the notion of identity and belonging to the nation. Bonet (2011)
argued, “As the most visible hand of the state and oftentimes the first one student
encounters, public schools have profound effects on the ability of students to
negotiate their sense of nation, belonging and citizenship” (p. 46). Since the report
was mandated, the situation remained painfully the same. There are still instances
where the public school stigmatizes Muslim children on the basis of their religion as
seen in the examples above. Thus, my study aimed to give a voice to Muslim youth
marginalized by both society and the school system.
Context/Background
In understanding the terrorist attacks of January 7, it is important to look at the
events that led to that fateful day, the Filière des Buttes Chaumont, and the
involvement of the Kouachi brothers (the perpetrators of the attack). It is additionally
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important to know who they were and where they came from to have a deep grasp of
their motivations. Who were the people that led them on their path of destruction?
Where did they gain their ideological beliefs from?
Looking at their past and the people they followed offer some insight into their
lives and the fateful day they carried their attacks. It also shed lights on the
importance of the French government in their upbringing and how the Republican
school played a role. As noted earlier, the Republican school criminalized Muslim
youth for having different beliefs and feelings about the Charlie Hebdo attacks. As a
matter of fact, France promotes the concept of Frenchness over cultural or ethnic
identity. Displaying a different point of view is seen as anti-French and a failure to
having integrated the French society fully. The Republic school is the vector of those
values and is responsible for teaching children using an assimilationist approach
(Simon, 2006; Bleich, 2000).
The Kouachi Brothers and their “fall” into Islamic fundamentalism.
The Filière des Buttes Chaumont, also known as the filière irakienne du
19e arrondissement (the Iraqi network of the 19th arrondissement), was a jihadist
network of which the Kouachi brothers were members (Vincent, 2008). The mosque
Adda’wa saw the creation of the Iraqi network in 2003 under the leadership of Farid
Benyettou (Tourancheau, 2005; Vincent, 2008). This network marked the beginning
of the terrorist path for the Kouachi brothers that led to the murder of 12 people. A
look into this network helps us understand the indoctrination of the Kouachi brothers
and other youth that led them to becoming Jihadi willing to sacrifice their lives for
their beliefs.
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Space and Place
The 19th arrondissement, the hometown. The 19th arrondissement is located
in Paris and is part of one of 20 districts or arrondissements. The 19th arrondissement
is home to two of Paris’s biggest parks: the Parc de la Villette (the biggest park in
Paris) and the Parc des Buttes Chaumont (the third biggest park in Paris). It is also the
home of the Conservatoire de Paris, one of the most renowned music schools in
Europe, and the Cité des Sciences et de L’Industrie, which houses a museum and an
exhibition center. It is a vibrant district with several events attracting people from all
over the capital (for example, the cinéma en plein air, otherwise known as the August
open air exhibition).
The 19th arrondissement is also home to immigrants, particularly those of
African descent (personal observations).5 While some parts of the district are posh,
such as near the town hall (district Armand Carrel), other parts can be pretty rough
like the 156 rue d’Aubervilliers, where the Kouachi brothers grew up.
The Kouachi brothers found a home and family at the mosque Adda’Wa. As a
matter of fact, the mosque filled a void left by the diminution of staff members due to
budget cut of youth organizations. Repeated budget cuts affected youth organizations
around France. In some cases, the budgets cuts were up 350% (Collectives des
Associations Citoyennes, 2016). Those youth organizations were places where
children from the neighborhood could come and mingle with other children under the
guidance of a youth mentor, usually from the same neighborhood. It helped steer the
youth from getting into trouble and keeping them occupied. However, once

The law of 1978 states “It is prohibited to collect or process personal data which reveals, directly or
indirectly, racial or ethnic origins, political, philosophical or religious opinions or trade union
membership, or which relate to health or to their sex life.”
5
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dismantled young people are left drifting. Disenfranchised youth has nowhere else to
go, no activities to keep them from being idle all day. Most specifically budget cuts
affecting “les éducateurs de rue” (street educators) could have a more serious impact.
Those streets educators are specialized in the prevention of radicalization. Véronique
Le Goaziou noted “On the field, educators see for themselves the risk of religious
radicalization. Specialized prevention has its own toolbox that it can activate to ensure
that young people who start showing worrying signs do not make it through to the
end. Educators therefore clearly have a card to play in the field of preventing
radicalization” (as cited in Jouanneau, 2016).
The mosque offered them a place where they could mingle, a sense of
community and belonging. The mosque Adda’Wa was that place for the Kouachi
brothers and other young people.
Mosque Adda’Wa, where it all began. In 1969, a group of Maghrebi
immigrants created the Association Cultuelle Islamique (ACI, or Islamic Cult
Association) (Sweeny, 2016). In 1979, The ACI acquired an old textile factory.
Rapidly the mosque became the biggest mosque in Europe with around 5000 believers
visiting the mosque on Fridays (Sweeny, 2016; Werley, 2015).
In 1994, Larbi Kechat, Adda’Wa’s rector, would later be under house arrest
for his presumed links with the Islamic Salvation Front, an Algerian political party
(Sweeny, 2016; Tourancheau, 2005). Nevertheless, the charges were later dropped. In
2004, Larbi Kechat became the honorary president of the association with all powers
regarding the management of the funds and the construction of the mosque. A
committee of honor, whose members remained anonymous until 2013, was also
created (Sweeny, 2016). It was later found that all the members of the committee were
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foreigners, and none resided in France. Among them was Omar Abdelkafy, an
Egyptian preacher and member of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, which
was created by Yusuf Al Qaradawi, an Egyptian Islamic Theologian, who was
suspected of having terrorist ties and was barred from entering France in 2012
(Sweeny 2016; Associated Press, 2012). Nevertheless, Larbi Kechat always
maintained that his mosque advocated a moderate form of Islam (Sweeny, 2016;
Tourancheau, 2005).
Yet, the mosque Adda’ Wa provided a fertile ground for homegrown terrorists.
Farid Benyettou the charismatic leader of the Iraqi network, found his most fervent
followers, the Kouachi brothers, among them. Those mentors and more specifically
their ideals resonated better with the Kouachi brothers. They became part of a
community where their ethnic and religious background was not being erased as well
as their voices. To better understand how the Kouachi brothers became members of
the terrorist cell “la filière des Buttes Chaumont'' a closer look at their mentors is
necessary to understand how education or the lack thereof played a role in this issue.
People
Farid Benyettou, the charismatic leader of the Iraqi network. Farid
Benyettou, the emblematic leader of the network, started recruiting young men from
the 19th arrondissement in 2003 to fight in the Iraq War (Vincent, 2008). Benyettou, a
man of Algerian descent and 23 years old at the time, was preaching at the mosque
Adda’Wa, where he spread his radical views6 (Tourancheau, 2005; Zagdoun, 2015).

6

Benyettou preached an Islam based on the 3 principles from Muhammad Ibn Abdelwahhab from
which derived wahhabism (Suc, 2016). Wahhabism is an ultra-fundamentalist form of Islam
considered to be the purest form of Islam strictly following the Sharia.
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Under the influence of his brother-in-law Youssef Zemmouri, a fundamentalist
Muslim, Benyettou became acquainted with an ultra-fundamentalist vision of Islam
(Tourancheau, 2005; Zagdoun, 2015). Zemmouri was a member of the Algerian
Groupe Salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC)—a terrorist organization—
and was arrested in 1998 for a terrorist plot during the FIFA World Cup
(Tourancheau, 2005; Zagdoun, 2015). After his arrest, Benyettou espoused his
brother-in-law’s ultra-fundamentalist vision of Islam, changing his clothing attire to
reflect his beliefs and immersing himself in religious books (Filiu, 2004;
Tourancheau, 2005). The year 2003 then marked the beginning of the Iraq War and
the beginning of the Iraqi network of the 19th arrondissement (Tourancheau, 2005;
Vincent, 2008). Benyettou vehemently protested the military intervention in Iraq, and
in March 2003 the police intercepted a coded message from Iraq from a jihadist from
the 19th arrondissement (Tourancheau, 2005). Benyettou preached outside the
mosque Pré-Saint-Gervais, wearing the official attire reserved for imams and was
subsequently expelled from the mosque (Filiu, 2004; Tourancheau, 2005). He later
joined the mosque Adda’wa and continued his preaching outside the official religious
teachings. As a result of his young age, his charisma, and connection to the
neighborhood, he was able to start his network, recruiting young men from the
neighborhood to go fight in Iraq against the Americans. Among those young men was
Chérif Kouachi, who later committed the attacks with his brother against Charlie
Hebdo. In 2004, Benyettou organized a collective prayer with young Muslims to
protest the law effectively banning religious signs in public schools (Filiu, 2004;
Tourancheau, 2005; Zagdoun, 2015). Benyettou grew increasingly critical of the
American presence in Iraq. To prepare for the jihad, Beneyttou and his followers
trained in the park Les Buttes Chaumont, which became the name of their network. He
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was arrested and convicted in 2005 for his role in the Iraqi network (Tourancheau,
2005; Zagdoun, 2015). He had a great influence on the Kouachi brothers and their
subsequent views on Islam as well as their newfound allegiance to the Iraqi network.
Therefore, the Brothers no longer had a place like the youth centers and instead
alternative measures were found that were problematic for them and created an
international incident. How students are socialized and how they are perceived in a
society is important, especially ones who are viewed as outsiders because of race,
ethnicity, and religion.
Boubaker El Hakim, the mentor. Boubaker El Hakim, born in the 19th
arrondissement of Paris in 1983, was of Tunisian descent and the other leader of the
Buttes Chaumont network. He was considered as the French senior officer of ISIS
(Seelow, 2016; Suc, 2016). In 2002, El Hakim left for Syria to study in salafis schools
and briefly reached Iraq (Seelow, 2016). He created the Buttes Chaumont network in
2003 with Farid Benyettou (Thiolay, 2015). He later left again for Iraq, where he was
interviewed by a journalist for RTL, a French radio show, while in a training camp for
jihadists. On the show, he proclaimed:
Je suis de Paris 19e! Tous mes potes dans le 19e je leur dis venez faire le
jihad! Je suis prêt à me faire exploser, mettre des dynamites et boum boum!
(Digiacomi, 2016).
I am from the 19th in Paris! I am telling all my friends in the 19th to come do
the Jihad! I am ready to blow myself up, put out dynamite, and boom boom!
El Hakim encouraged the youth from the 19th arrondissement to come fight “the war”
with him. His message was heard by some youth, the Kouachi brothers being among
them, who later left to train for the jihad. It was the beginning of the destructive path
taken by the Kouachi brothers that led to the attacks of January 2015. The violent
message was heard by those marginalized Muslim youth. Where the Republican
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schools failed to reach them, the fundamentalist Muslim El Hakim succeeded. El
Hakim provided a space where they felt they belonged unlike the French society that
viewed and treated them as others. Their voices for the first time were heard
throughout the world, through their bloody attack of Charlie Hebdo, a journal
representing a symbol of freedom of speech. By shedding light on how Muslim youth
currently perceive their identity also is important to understand why they feel
marginalized. Thus, highlighting the importance of place such as youth organizations
for the youth to belong but also for their voices to be heard and respected as French
citizens and an integral part of the French society. Mentors are also important to be
the bridge between the Republic and the disenfranchised Muslim youth, while
promoting a sense of belonging to the Republic (Jouanneau, 2016).
Four days later in a TV interview, El Hakim declared:
Je viens de France, on va tuer les Américains! On va tuer tout le monde, nous!
Je vis en France, moi! Allahû akbar! (Suc, 2016).
I am from France. We are going to kill the Americans! We are going to kill
everybody! I live in France! Allah Akbar!
A decade later he was able to put his plan in motion through the Kouachi brothers.
Because they had been marginalized by the French society, he was able to reach them
and manipulate them into committing those heinous acts.
The lack of belonging physically, educationally, and socially created this entryway for
these extreme fundamentalists to manipulate already vulnerable young men.
In 2005, El Hakim was arrested and sent back to France where he continued
his work with the network. He is seen as a hero who actually fought the jihad
(Suc, 2016; Thiolay, 2015). He was arrested in 2005 and convicted in 2008 to serve
ten years incarcerated. While in prison El Hakim continued his work as a jihadist
training fellow inmate (Suc, 2016). Released in 2011, he left to go live in Tunisia, his
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parents’ birthplace, after the fall of the regime of Tunisian president Ben Ali. He
became the leader of the commando unit dedicated to perpetrating terrorist attacks in
France. He is presumed to be behind the Charlie Hebdo attacks, in part as a result of
his longstanding connection and influence on the Kouachi brothers, as well as the
November 13 terrorist attacks. He was killed by an American Drone in Syria in
December 2016 (Digiacomi, 2016; Suc, 2016).
Chérif and Saïd Kouachi, the perpetrators. The Kouachi brothers were born
in the 1980s to Algerian parents. They grew up in the 19th arrondissement of Paris at
156 Aubervilliers Street. This neighborhood is where the Kouachi brothers, Chérif
and Saïd, spent their childhood before moving away after the death of their mother
(Lebourg, 2015). The decaying tower was known to be a pedophiles’ lair. Young
children would hang around in the parking garage, their parents unable to look after
them (Lebourg, 2015). The Kouachi brothers and their other siblings would often be
left without supervision by their mother, while she was trying to make ends meet,
sometimes resorting to prostitution (Lebourg, 2015). Two of the five children had
already been placed in the foster care system.
Evelyne, one of the residents of the tower, remembers the Kouachi brothers.
She recounted witnessing a particular incident when one of the building managers
asked Chérif to drop on his knees to apologize (Lebourg, 2015). The Kouachi brothers
became orphans at an early age. Chérif and his brother one day discovered their
mother dead from a drug overdose (Lebourg, 2015). Now orphans, Chérif and Saïd
were sent alongside their little brother and sister to a youth center specializing in
isolated foreign youth in Southwestern France. Thus, most of their upbringing was
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under the guidance of the French government and the Republican school. They did
not grow up in a radicalized household as it is often believed.
The Republican school instilled the values of the Republic in them “liberty,
equality, brotherhood”. The French government had a big influence on their
upbringing yet decades later they would commit an attack against a Journal, which
displayed a value upheld by the Republic that of freedom of speech. Why would the
Kouachi brothers, who did not grow up in a radicalized household but were raised
with French values through the republican school, later became terrorists? When
thinking of their identity did they perceive themselves as French or did they perceive
themselves as Muslim with the ethnic background of their parents. The perception of
Muslim youth of their identity can give a possible explanation for the lack of
allegiance to the French republic from the Kouachi brothers. Given the treatments of
Muslim youth by the Republican schools and its agents we can begin to understand
why the Kouachi brothers turned to others who embraced them fully. Why would
disenfranchised youth have allegiance to a country that mistreat them and treat them
as second-class citizens all the while promoting Frenchness and Oneness, effectively
excluding them from those ideals?
At the beginning of the 2000s, they returned to Paris, where they started
attending meetings with a group of young salafis under the leadership of Farid
Benyettou, whose practice and views of Islam were more rigoristic following
Wahhabism (Pelletier, 2015). They would train at the Parc Les Buttes Chaumont in
order to later join Al-Qaeda in Iraq. Chérif was arrested in January 2005 on his way to
Syria (Pelletier, 2015; Samuel and Sawer, 2015). In 2008, Chérif was convicted of
associating with criminals for a terrorist enterprise and sentenced to three years in
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prison with 18 months suspended. He was released as he already served his time
between 2005 and 2006 while in preventive custody (Samuel and Sawer, 2015).
During his imprisonment, Chérif met Djamel Beghal. Beghal was serving a ten-year
sentence for his part in plotting an attack against the US embassy in Paris. He also
met Salim Benghalem, a French national of Algerian descent, and one of the US’s
most wanted international terrorists (Samuel and Sawer, 2015). Unlike his brother
Chérif, Saïd Kouachi was only in police custody for his link with the network and was
never convicted. He later flew to Yemen in 2011 to receive military training with AlQaeda Yemen.
The Kouachi brothers were under the surveillance of the French and US secret
governmental agencies, and their surveillance by the French authorities ended six
months before the attacks due to lack of evidence (Arfi, 2015). On January 7, 2015,
the Kouachi brothers would carry out the Charlie Hebdo attack and kill 12 people.
Often when such an atrocity occurs, the background of the perpetrators is
closely scrutinized; the family is seen as “other” and not properly integrated into the
French society as Polonska-Kimunguyi and Gillespie (2016) stated: “Having been
born in Paris made the two brothers French citizens, a fact never mentioned by F247 in
the period covered. Instead, frequent references to their ‘Algerian origin’ and status of
‘offspring of Algerian parents’ (France 24, 2015) portrayed them as foreign” (p. 575).
Noteworthy is the fact that the brothers born of Algerian parents were
orphaned and raised by different French institutions (Lebourg, 2015). Therefore, the
Republican school had an influence on their upbringing. Thus, is it important to look
at ways the Republican school can help students feel less marginalized and more a
7
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part of the French society. Welch and Perivolaris (2016) observed that “The terrorists’
gesture in carrying out the attacks was to bring back home the globalized conflict of
terrorism and insurgency, opening up a front of that battle at the heart of their own
country; but in doing so as French citizens, they simultaneously raised the question
precisely of their own sense of identity, locatedness and attachment to the place of
their birth” (p. 281). In a post 9/11 era, terrorism has been mostly linked to Islam and
by extension to Muslims and Arabs, now representing a negative “Other” (Nurullah,
2010, p. 1022). Views of Muslims in the Western world were impacted.
Statement of the Problem
The events of January 2015 deeply impacted Muslims. Muslims are constantly
asked to justify themselves for attacks they did not commit but are associated with,
simply because of them sharing the same religion as the terrorists. They were also
seemingly asked to condemn the attacks in order to prove their allegiance to the
Republic. Disgruntled Muslims expressed their feelings about having to prove their
allegiance, many pointing out that when a person from another community committed
a heinous act, only the individual was held responsible and not the entire community.
Guénolé (2015) pointed out that “To specifically demand that Muslims in France,
condemn this act is to lock up these French people in religious labeling. It is therefore
to look at them from a non-republican perspective” (paras. 4).
It is to look at them as Muslims and not as French citizens whose religion is
Islam. It is to further marginalize them as not being an integral part of the French
society because of their faith. Postcolonial theory offers a different theoretical
perspective to address the dislocation of Eurocentrism in predominant ideas of
Western, identity, culture, science, and education (Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin.,
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1995). Postcolonial theory’s concepts of otherization, hybridity, subaltern etc. can be
used to explain this societal phenomenon. Critical race theory allows us to look at the
construct of race and racism in the French society. Two tenets are particularly
interesting when studying this phenomenon. The first tenet is “racism is ordinary not
aberrational” (p. 7). Color blindness makes it difficult to challenge racism as it insists
on the fact that everyone receives equal treatment regardless of color. For example, in
France ethnic data that mention the race of the participants is forbidden. France looks
at its citizens through the concept of Frenchness and not race. However, at the same
time France practices “Differential racialization” (p. 9). Muslims is the minority
group that is seen as a problem compared to other minorities mostly based on their
faith. When some Muslims refuse to conform, some French politicians, philosophers
and commoners alike strongly voiced their opinion about the failure of assimilation to
the French society of those Muslims. Muslim youth were not spared from the public
opprobrium. In the French Republican school, the refusal to do the minute of silence
of an 8-year child was not seen as the rebellious act of a child but the overt action of a
future potential terrorist. Their allegiance to France is questioned. Are they well
integrated into the French society? Is them being Muslim a sign of anti-Frenchness?
The problem is how this same youth perceive their cultural identity in the light of the
events. “Perception is like a set of lenses through which an individual views reality.
These lenses evolve from perspectives of location, subjectivity, particularity, history,
embodiment, contradiction, and the web of teachings imparted to the individual”
(Munhall, 2008). As a research examining perception allows us to understand the
meaning of the participants’ live experiences. Through their voices one can begin to
understand “multiple realities that are socially constructed based on these
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perceptions” (Munhall, 2008) How do they feel about their French identity while
maintaining their Muslim faith and identity? How do they feel about the treatments
they receive in the aftermath of the attacks? Studies specifically investigating this
explosive situation are scarce if non-existent given the fact that it is a current situation
that is still unfolding. Studies giving voices to the Muslim youth in a post Charlie
Hebdo Île de France and most particularly from the same neighborhood of the
perpetrators of the attacks do not exist.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this case study was to investigate the negotiation of Muslim
youth identity in a post-Charlie Hebdo France. This qualitative study also examined
the effect of the attacks on educational policies.
While being interviewed on National Public Radio (NPR), Karen Greensberg
(2017) explained:
OK. So, let's be clear. Eighty percent of the individuals involved in these
terrorist plots or wanting to go abroad are U.S. citizens. Sixty percent of them
are U.S.-born, and 40 percent of them are converts. So, in other words, this is
a homegrown issue. And we need to address the fact that there are - there is a
wide swath with different ethnicities, different nationalities, different religions
that are attracted to the message of ISIS. And we need to nip this in the bud
earlier. We need to take care of these individuals when they're younger. Many
of them start to go down this road when they're teens. And we need to focus
here and begin to think about this in an ameliorative way if we're going to
truly feel safe in our country (2017).
Therefore, it is important to study Muslims’ youth and their identity formation as
many terrorists are homegrown terrorists. It is also important to look at the impact the
educational system and the educational policies have on fueling resentment amongst
Muslim youth.
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Theoretical Framework
This present study was grounded in two theories: postcolonial theory and
critical race theory. Looking at France colonial past and its influence on its ancient
colonies through the prism of Postcolonial theory allows us to take a closer look at the
“the ongoing significance of the colonial encounter for people’s live both in the west
and the non-west” (Prasad, 2003, p. 3). The descendants of the immigrants from the
ancient French colonies are still considered as others when they are asked to be
integrated into the French society in which they were born.
This study sought to understand how otherization has an influence on Muslim
youth perception of their identity through the prism of postcolonial theory. This study
also aimed to give a voice to these Muslim youth using critical race theory. Its key
constructs of identity and culture also offers a way to understand identity perception
by Muslim youth.
Postcolonial Theory
Postcolonial studies draw on critical theory in order to comprehend and
analyze the loss of power, culture, and identity when a group of people is subjected to
the dominance of another group. The West’s colonization, imperialism, and
decolonization served as a basis, even though today it has been expanded to include a
multiplicity of racial, geographical, and cultural contexts and histories.
Postcolonial theory seeks to criticize what is considered to be the “traditional”
value system and epistemology from which western philosophy, politics, education,
and social-economic concepts draw their source. The “othering” of the dominated
cultures resulted from the interaction of the colonizer and the colonized as well as the
feeling of superiority commonly exhibited in the colonizer, as “some groups, when
they have become large and powerful, have set out to prove that their superiority
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gives them the right over the material possessions and even the lives of others” (Ada
& Compoy, 2004, p. 16). Postcolonial theory today is applied in different fields such
as anthropology, education, literature, history, and so forth to shed light on matters of
poverty, race, and inequalities, as well as the loss of cultural heritage and indigenous
knowledge including language. Postcolonial theory aims to disrupt and resist
imperialism and colonialism (Crossley & Tickly, 2004, p. 148). In other words, it
offers a different theoretical perspective to address the dislocation of Eurocentrism in
predominant ideas of Western, identity, culture, science, and education (Ashcroft,
Griffiths & Tiffin., 1995). Postcolonial theory can also help explain a societal
phenomenon but cannot predict it. Postcolonial theory “comprises instead a related set
of perspectives, which are juxtaposed against one another, on occasion
contradictorily” (Young, 2003, pp. 6-7).
Postcolonial theory thus considers different viewpoints and power relations
among people who have been oppressed:
Postcolonial theory represents a complex field of study, encompassing an
array of matters that include issues such as identity, gender, race, racism, and
ethnicity…focuses on exploding knowledge systems underpinning
colonialism, neocolonialism, and various forms of oppression and exploitation
present today…challenges epistemic violence; that is, it questions the
undervaluing, destruction, and appropriation of colonized people’s knowledge
and ways of knowing, including the colonizer’s use of that knowledge against
them to serve the colonizer’s interests. Postcolonial theory therefore offers a
critique of imperial knowledge systems and languages and how they are
circulated and legitimated and how they serve imperial interests. (Lunga,
2008, p. 193).
It is also important to note that postcolonial theory is not a methodological
framework solely used to analyze socio-historical phenomena, since post- may
suggest such. Indeed, while attaching the prefix post- to colonial can indicate
significant breaks in consciousness and subjectivities, for me the term lacks the
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political and historical referents to the powerful social movements of the anti-colonial
and masks the significant continuities in the history of violence and capitalist
exploitation in the modern, modernizing, and late modern worlds. While it is
necessary that the culture and politics of late modern and neoliberal racial and gender
formations be understood in all their contemporary specificity, I would argue for the
need to simultaneously name, locate, and analyze these formations as the historical
legacies of colonialism and imperialism (Carby, 2007, p. 215).
Noteworthy are the different topics addressed by authors who use a
postcolonial framework. It encompasses matters “of slavery, migration and diaspora
formation; the effects of race, culture, class, and gender in postcolonial settings;
histories of resistance and struggle against colonial and neo-colonial domination; the
complexities of identity formation and hybridity; language and language rights; the
ongoing struggles of indigenous peoples for recognition of their rights” (Crossley &
Tickly, 2004, p. 148). There are several key postcolonial terms. Given the topic of this
dissertation and the literature review, the following terms will be explored:
(1) hybridity, (2) other/othering, (3) subaltern, (4) language, (5) ethnicity, (6) identity,
(7) culture, and (8) cultural education.
In their book Post Colonial Studies: The Key terms Second Edition Ashcroft,
Griffiths and Tiffin (2007) explore the different key terms in postcolonial studies:
Hybridity is defined as one of the most contested word in post-colonial
studies. It refers to the creation of new transcultural forms in the “Third Space of
Enunciation” (p. 109). In this “Third Space” a new cultural identity that is a mix
between the colonized culture and the colonizer’s culture emerges.
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Other/Othering are two interconnected process according to Ashcroft et al.
Other is defined as a person who is “separate from one’s self” (p. 154). The colonized
person is “other” in the eye of the colonizer. Othering is the process by which
colonizers create its “others” (p. 156) Ashcroft et al. (2007) further state “the
construction of the O/other is fundamental to the construction of the Self” (p. 156).
Subaltern refers to those who are “inferior in rank” (p. 198). Those who have
been othered, i.e., the colonized are viewed as “subaltern” by the colonizers.
Language is both a tool of colonization and the tool of resistance. Colonizers
used their language to assimilate and colonized the population they encountered. In
some instances, children were beaten for speaking their native language. Language
then became a tool of resistance for some colonized people. It is a way to affirm
oneself to be close to their ethnic culture.
Ethnicity is defined as the culture, tradition, language, social pattern, and
ancestry of a group (Ashcroft et al., 2007, p. 75). The authors powerfully state “a
person’s ethnic group is such a powerful identifier because while he or she chooses to
remain in it, it is an identity that cannot be denied, rejected, or taken away by others.
Whereas race emerged as a way of establishing a hierarchical division between
Europe and its “others,” identifying people according to fixed genetic criteria,
ethnicity is usually deployed as an expression of a positive self-perception that offers
certain advantages to its members” (p. 75)
This dissertation will also look at the data through the prism of critical race
theory.
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Critical Race theory
Critical race theory (CRT) is also used to inform the present study. CRT is
concerned with “empowering human beings to transcend the constraints placed on
them by race, class, and gender” (Creswell, 2012). CRT specifically focused on the
construct of race and racism in the American society. However, CRT can be applied
to any society where race and racism play an important role within the framework of a
particular society. There is a popular saying sometimes attributed to Winston
Churchill, though no one can prove for sure he actually said it, that goes “history is
written by the victors.” The following African proverb is in the same spirit: “until the
lion has his own storyteller, the hunter will always have the best part of the story.”
CRT aims to give people of color a voice that is often unheard. It helps depict a more
accurate picture of a story and therefore may help “shatter the complacency that may
accompany such privilege and challenge the dominant discourses that serve to
suppress people on the margins of society” (Creswell, 2012, pp. 31-32). Through CRT
one seeks not only to “explain the experiences of people of color [but also] offer
transformative solution to racial, gender, and class subordination in our societal and
institutional structures” (Creswell, 2012, p. 32).
Delgado and Stefancic (2001) laid out the basic tenets of CRT:
● The first tenet is “racism is ordinary not aberrational” (p. 7). Color blindness
makes it difficult to challenge racism as it insists on the fact that everyone
receives equal treatment regardless of color. For example, in France ethnic
data that mention the race of the participants is forbidden. France looks at its
citizens through the concept of Frenchness and not race. Race is erased as it is
incompatible with the French Republic’s values.
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● The second tenet is “interest convergence or material determinism” (p. 8).
Racism benefits most White people regardless of their socioeconomic.
Therefore, there is little incentive to change things except if it will benefit
them. France was and still is to some extent a colonial empire. It benefits from
its former colonies’ immense resources. To continue profiting it is in the best
interest of the French nation to promote commonness and maintain the former
colonies in a state of subalternism. The Organisation internationale de la
Francophonie (OIF) or simply La Francophonie is an organization “influenced
by the quest of leaders of Francophone countries for an organizational
framework for its member states. As its heritage is more cultural than political
in nature, la Francophonie is essentially a matter of values permeating a
culture or of a language as a unifying force”. (as cited in Mason, 1999)
● The third tenet is “Race and racism are products of social thoughts and
relations” (p. 8). There is no scientific basis to support the construct of race.
● The fourth tenet is “Differential racialization” (p. 9). It is the way the
dominant society will racialize different minority groups at different times
based on their needs. France like many other countries reinforces the
distinction between the different minorities. Asian minorities are often seen as
the minority model whereas minorities from the African diaspora are seen as
problematic.
● The last tenet is “a unique voice of color” (p. 10). The narratives of minorities
offer a unique and powerful way to describe their experiences on race and
racism with their white counterparts.
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CRT Key Constructs. Through the lens of critical race theory, the topic at
hand can be investigated, and young Muslim participants can be given a voice where
they can tell their story and their perspective on the matter. Two CRT key constructs
important for the study are Identity and Culture.
Identity: Identity is a recurrent topic in postcolonial theory and more
specifically the notion of self. Identity is the way an individual or a group of people
defines itself. It is important when it comes to the concept of self, social values, and
national understanding. It includes both essentialism and othering. In colonial
discourse the “self is “coherent, bounded, individualized, intentional, the locus of
thought, action, and belief, the origin of its own actions, the beneficiary of a unique
biography” (Rose 1998, p. 3). However, CRT and postcolonial theory challenges this
notion of self and attempts to offer a different understanding of the concept of self.
Young Muslims must navigate through different identities such as “border-crossing
identity, transnational identity, hyphenated identity, hybridity, double consciousness,
and multiple negotiated identities” (Tindongan, 2011, p. 75).
Culture: The concept of culture has evolved over time and holds different
meanings in different disciplines. For the purpose of this study the concept of culture
was viewed from a sociological standpoint. It was engaged as the ways of thinking,
speaking, acting, and the material objects that together shape a people’s way of life.
(Macionis & Gerber, 2010).
Research Questions
Most of the terrorist attacks in France were perpetrated by French nationals
who were attracted to Jihad. Those French nationals grew up in France with the
values of the French Republic. They received a French education in a system

39

promoting Frenchness and loyalty to its Republic. How did they become terrorists?
Why do they feel more allegiance toward the Islamic State than to the French nation?
As such, this study posed the following questions:
1. How do Muslim youth construct their cultural identity?
2. What is the impact of laïcité in the construction of Muslim youth identity?
3. How did the terrorist attacks impact Muslims’ lived experiences?
4. How do the terrorist attacks impact educational policies?
Rationale and Significance of the Study
There are relatively few empirical studies available regarding French Muslim
youth’s school and lived experiences following the terrorist attacks of 2015. Further
there has been no study investigating the effects of the ongoing terrorist attacks since
January 2015 on young Muslims in France. Most of the published literature on
identity negotiation of young Arab Muslim in France remains mainly conceptual. This
qualitative research was developed in an effort to provide empirical data on young
Muslims in France. In addition, there are few if none, studies concentrating
specifically on young Muslims attending or who attended secondary schools in the
19th arrondissement, the hometown of the Kouachi brothers. The study aimed to shed
light on the experience of young Muslims attending or who attended a secondary
school in a secular society such as France post January 2015.
The study will contribute to the understanding of identity negotiation of young
Muslims in a post-Charlie Hebdo France.
Assumptions of the Study
For the purpose of this study, I made the following assumptions. First,
participants would willingly participate in the study. I assumed that participants would
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respond truthfully to the interview questions. To increase the possibility of truthful
responses, participants would be guaranteed anonymity and confidentiality.
Pseudonyms assigned to participants would be used instead of any identifying
information. I assumed that young Muslims could be given a voice where they could
tell their story and their perspective on the matter. Lastly, I presumed that the terrorist
attacks of January 2015 were and continue to be disruptive to education and the
teaching and learning process and have had an impact on the negotiation of identity of
young Muslims as well as educational policies.
Delimitations of the Study
This study was limited to Muslim youth attending or who attended a
secondary school in the 19th arrondissement and who lived in the 19th arrondissement
at the time of the interview. This study focused on French-born Muslims of African
immigrant descent (Maghreb and sub-Sahara). Muslims of other origins were not
directly relevant to the present study. It is also important to note that this study could
only focus on participants 18 years and older. At first, this study intended to focus on
middle school aged students. However, obtaining permission from the schools was
extremely difficult because of the sensitive nature of the study. Despite multiple
attempts to contact the schools to allow for the study to take place in their
establishments they simply refused to respond to my requests. When I contacted one
of the schools directly the secretary told me to not insist any further and to not be
surprised if they were not responding given the nature of the topic and the
unwillingness to speak about it.
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Summary
As France attempts to cope with recent tragic events, the country faces many
challenges. One of these challenges is its response to Islam. Islam has always been a
complicated question for France; however, the events of January and November 2015
have exacerbated the issue. France, through the Republican school, aims to reaffirm
the republican principles and most particularly laïcité. The challenges to teaching the
values of the Republic and the French national identity while facing an everincreasing diversity remain the task of teachers. Young Muslims find themselves at a
crossroads, facing multiple challenges as well such as integration, assimilation, their
religious beliefs, and their cultural affiliation, all the while navigating a hostile social
and political climate. The goal of my study is to give a voice to this disenfranchised
youth, while demonstrating the importance to establish a dialogue between Muslim
youth where their voices are heard by the French Republic and most specifically the
Republican school.
Organization of the Study
The organization of this dissertation is as follows:
Chapter I: Introduction of the context in which the terrorist attacks took place. The
chapter introduces the background of the study, the statement of the problem, the
purpose, the theoretical and conceptual frameworks, key terms and the research
questions.
Chapter II: Literature Review focuses on the historical background of France that led
to this complex situation. It also provides the scholarly background for the study while
showing the gaps in the literature that this study aimed to help fill.
Chapter III: Methods detail how the study was conducted along with information
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about participants. It examines qualitative case study methodology and the importance
of this methodology for this inquiry. I then discuss the data analysis processes. I also
tackle the role and background of the researcher. I also discuss subjectivity,
trustworthiness, and ethical considerations.
Chapters IV A and IV B: Findings and Analysis is a presentation of findings, results,
and analyses.
Chapter V: Discussion and Implications for Practice is reviewed to give meaning
to the findings, results, and analyses, and their implications for future research on
topic of Muslim youth identity.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
Introduction
The aim of my study is to investigate the negotiation of a Muslim youth
identity and their educational as well as lived experiences following the terrorist
attacks of January 2015 in France. In this chapter, the literature on French schooling
sheds light on how the ideology of the French Republican school reinforces the
concept of universalism, thus effectively erasing cultural differences in the school
context. Following this discussion, the literature on French national identity will be
reviewed in order to further understand how the nation of liberty, equality, fraternity
and its core principle of universalism is also known for its long-standing tradition of
welcoming immigrants whose lived realities contradict this notion of universalism.
Next, this chapter discusses colonization and immigration and its place in the national
curriculum. This chapter concludes with a review of the literature on Muslim youth
identity and identifications of gaps and limitations in the literature.
The French Revolution of 1789 and its Legacies
In order to grasp the concept of laïcité, French national identity, or
Frenchness, and the concept of the Republican school, an understanding of the
philosophical outcomes of the French Revolution is essential.
Laïcité
The siècles des lumières (Centuries of Enlightenment) in France marked a
turning point in the history of France. Intellectuals sought to undermine the Old
Regime and its centuries of privileges and social inequity, by overthrowing the
absolute monarchy as well as the influence of the Catholic Church (Kuru, 2009). Even
though “the aim of the Revolution was not, as once was thought, to destroy the
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authority of the Church and religious faith in general” (De Tocqueville, 1955, p. 19),
it did effectively reduce the authority of the Catholic Church. However, the monarchy
and the Church formed one ruling entity with the monarchy being considered the fille
aînée de l’église [elder daughter of the Church]. Intellectuals at the time sought to
create a secular democratic form of government that would encompass the concepts of
equality, liberty, and inalienable rights. Nevertheless, the separation of the Church
and State was still not fully complete. In an attempt to regulate the Church, the
National Constituent Assembly passed the Civil Constitution of the Clergy in 1790.
This statute aimed to establish a church subordinated to the State rather than the Pope,
as seen in Title II, Article XXI:
Before the ceremony of consecration begins, the bishop elect shall take a
solemn oath, in the presence of the municipal officers, of the people, and of the
clergy, to guard with care the faithful of his diocese who are confided to him, to be
loyal to the nation, the law, and the king, and to support with all his power the
constitution decreed by the National Assembly and accepted by the king (Robinson,
1904, p. 425). The Concordat of 1801 acknowledged the Catholic faith as the religion
of the great majority of French people. However, the State had the control over the
nomination of the bishops and would pay clerical salaries (Goyau, 1908).
The Law of 1905 marked the absolute separation of the Church and State as
article 2 noted, “The Republic does not recognize, remunerate or subsidize any
religion” (The Senate, 1905). Furthermore, the law granted the State the right to
control and ultimately have power over the religions. Even though it granted the
liberty to express one’s belief, it also sought to protect the people from religious
control. Religious groups had to register as an association cultuelles (“religious”
association) and were submitted to strict regulations (Association cultuelles, 1905).
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Interestingly the law of 1905 currently does not apply to Alsace-Lorraine, which was
at the time a territory of the German empire. The law of 1905 established total French
secularism, or laïcité. French secularism particularly in education is viewed as
incompatible with Muslim students’ Faith. Later, it would translate into a ban on any
religious sign specifically targeting the headscarves worn by Muslim female students.
If they refused to remove their headscarves, they were denied entry to school further
marginalizing them.
The Republican School
The principles of the French Republic and its concepts of laïcité, universalism,
and assimilation are best conveyed by the Republican school.
The Republican school would become the guarantor of laïcité and the vector
of the concepts of liberté, égalité, fraternité [liberty, equality, brotherhood]. It is “an
instrument of the secular state for the public education of the future citizens, where all
religious symbols are banned and public spirit should be taught…The public school is
then meant to produce French citizens and not the citizens of a multiethnic polity”
(Galeotti, 1993, p. 592). The debate over the mission and centrality of schools began
during the Revolution of 1789.
From the Constituent Assembly, three reports—de Talleyrand, de Condorcet,
and de Le Pelletier—influenced the modern conception of the French Republican
school. De Condorcet was the first one to propose a free, secular public education,
stating that “instruction should be universal … [and] distributed with all the equality
which available resources allow” (Condorcet, 1792). However, it was not until the
appointment of Jules Ferry as the minister of Public Instruction that school became
free, mandatory and secular. Ferry replaced religious instruction by courses on
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morality. Nonetheless, Ferry was not anti-religious and thus offered a school-free day
for students’ need for religious instruction (Kuru, 2009, p. 146).
A highly centralized system
From the French Revolution of 1789, the Republican school inherited a
highly centralized organization. The universalistic principle of the Republic is thought
to best promote equality and a strong French identity. However, the notion the French
have of equality can, according to Limaje (2000) deepen inequalities as the notion of
equality progressively comes to mean that all citizens confronted by a similar
situation should be treated identically under the law… This critical definition has a
basic weakness. The concept of equality before the law has had little impact on
reducing economic, social and cultural inequalities in France” (pp. 74-75). To remedy
this situation and offer equality of opportunity, the zones d’éducation prioritaires
(ZEP) (educational priority zone) were created in 1981. Today ZEP have been
replaced by REP and REP+— “Réseau d'éducation prioritaire” [priority education
network]; nonetheless, the term ZEP remains widely used in the educational system
when referring to those programs. Schools located in ZEPs are usually allocated
additional teachers and security personnel; they also have a greater autonomy.
However, the Ministère de l’Education Nationale de l’Enseignement Supérieur et de
la Recherche (2012) noted that ZEPs were not effective, mostly benefitting teachers
rather than students. Moreover, a process of decentralization starting in the 1990s
sought to facilitate the management of the school system at the micro level. Regional
and local governments were thus given more autonomy to deal with local issues and
provide tailored solutions. Nonetheless, the State still decides and implements
educational policies and the National Curriculum. The Kouachi brothers along with
the disenfranchised youth received an education, where they were taught the morals
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and values of the French Republic through a uniform national curriculum. Their
history, their backgrounds, their parents' history was a footnote in French history
books. Their uniqueness was never part of the curriculum. Those students could never
see themselves reflected in this French curriculum. Postcolonial studies draw on
critical theory in order to comprehend and analyze the loss of power, culture, and
identity when a group of people is subjected to the dominance of another group such
as Muslim youth are for example.
Postcolonial theory today is applied in different fields such as anthropology,
education, literature, history, and so forth to shed light on matters of poverty, race,
and inequalities, as well as the loss of cultural heritage and indigenous knowledge
including language. Postcolonial theory aims to disrupt and resist imperialism and
colonialism (Crossley & Tickly, 2004, p. 148). In other words, it offers a different
theoretical perspective to address the dislocation of Eurocentrism in predominant
ideas of Western, identity, culture, science, and education (Ashcroft, Griffiths &
Tiffin., 1995).
Teachers, who are civil servants, are responsible for disseminating Republican
values ensuring that young French pupils would develop a French identity and
become active members of the French society. Limaje (2000) noted “the civil service
is viewed as the best status for teachers to ensure that they remain independent of
outside pressures, be they of passing political views, the voices of families or children
or religious positions” (p. 75).
Teachers are paragons of knowledge trusted to instruct the National
Curriculum, leaving “outside knowledge, experience and aspirations stop[ped] at the
school door. Other concepts of the school’s responsibility to respond to the ‘whole’
child are simply not relevant to the prevalent French philosophy of
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schooling/instruction” (Limaje, 2000, p. 80). Teachers are at the center of a
centralized education system.
Their domain and position of power is the classroom. Teachers are to teach the
future French citizens and thus the different cultural identities that can coexist in a
classroom are erased to give place to the future French citizen. The curriculum taught
is uniform and the same in every part of France and its ancient colonies that are now
considered French regions. Thus, the little black girl in Guadeloupe whose ancestors
were slaves brought to the island on slave ships will be taught that her ancestors were
the Gauls, the original people of France. Evers (2013) sought to examine the impact
of several initiatives led by the Minister of Education and local governments on
French-Muslim youth in Marseille. The goal of those initiatives was to transform
French-Muslim youth from disenfranchised projects into “secular, upwardly mobile
individuals” (p. 435). Two of those initiatives analyzed were the use of Modern
Standard Arabic (MSA) in school in conjunction with Greek and Latin and as part of
Mediterranean languages thus “impelling youth to replace their putative claims to
Islamic personhood with a secular Greco-Roman model of personhood” (p. 438). The
second initiative was the rebranding of MSA as an elite language, which could offer
French-Muslim students from poor neighborhood a way to move upward. The study
included students aged 11-14 years old as well as their teachers. The academic
inspector was also interviewed. Evers (2013) found that those initiatives was an
attempt to erase French-Muslim students’ religious affiliations and their modest social
status. Those initiatives were in direct contrast with how those students perceived
themselves and understood their identities. Thus, raising concerns from the French
state, who linked French-Muslim youth with local criminal and terrorist activities (p.
438)

49

Laïcité and the headscarf debate
A controversy arose in 1989 when three female Muslim students wore their
veils to a public school in Creil. They were suspended by the principal and asked to
remove their headscarves. The principal argued that a key objective of the school was
to limit excessive external signs of religious or cultural belonging. In other words,
students had to respect the secular aspect of the school. After much debate over the
matter, the State Council decided in November 1989 that students were free ‘to
express and manifest their religious beliefs within public institutions out of respect for
pluralism, without infringing on educational activities of the curriculum and the
obligation to attend class” (Kastoryano, 2006, p. 59). However, a sharp turn was
operated in 2003 with the Stasi commission:
The secular state, guarantor of freedom of conscience, protects not only
freedom of religion and of speech but also the individual; it allows all to freely
choose, or not, a spiritual or religious option, to change it, or to renounce it. It makes
sure that no group, no community can impose on anyone a belonging or a
denominational identity, especially because of his or her origins. (Commission de
Réflexion sur l’Application du Principe de Laïcité dans la République, 2003, p. 14).
The edict continued, noting that the expression of one’s cultural or religious identity
should still be bound to the secular realm: the exacerbation of cultural identity should
not become a fanatical defense of difference, bringing with it, oppression and
exclusion. In a secular society, each person must be able to take some distance about
tradition. That does not involve any renunciation of oneself but rather an individual
act of liberty that allows one to define oneself in relation to one’s cultural and
spiritual references without being subjected to them (p. 16). However, even though
laïcité does not impede one from expressing his or her spiritual beliefs the report
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emphasized: Beyond the status of religions, the requirement of laïcité also calls on
everyone to work on him or herself.
Through secularism, the citizen gains protection of his freedom of conscience;
in return, he must respect the public space that everyone can share. Demanding state
neutrality does not seem very compatible with the display of an aggressive
proselytism, particularly within the schools. Being willing to adapt the public
expression of one’s religious particularities and to set limits to the affirmation of
one’s identity allows everyone to meet in the public space (p. 16). In 2004, the
legislation banning ostentatious religious signs in public schools was put to a vote.
Even though this law applied to all religions, the law became known as the “headscarf
ban” legislation, emphasizing the strong anti-Muslim implications of the law.
Those laws did nothing to bridge the gap between French-Muslim youth and
the secular state. Andre, Mansouri and Lobo (2015) examined the Muslim youth
through the lenses of Muslim religious leaders. Where did they received their
religious education from? What role do they play as religious leaders while addressing
a disenfranchised youth and minimizing the risk of radicalization? They argued that
some French Muslims are able to navigate their French citizenship and their Muslim
identity quite expertly, while others find it difficult to navigate between assimilating
into a French secular state and their faith (p. 298). Andre et al. (2015) argued that this
small minority, which is already marginalized did not find a way to reconcile their
faith and migrant heritage with their French identity. Therefore, it gave rise to a
certain religious revivalism, emphasizing the failure of the French state to connect
with all its citizens. Instead “for the last 20 years, an imported Salafist proselytism has
gained ground in France particularly among the young, disenfranchised Muslims of
the banlieues and has preached and imposed stricter practices, such as wearing the
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niqab for women” (Andre et al., 2015, p. 299). However, even if they advocate a
stricter view of Islam only a small fraction will eventually become Jihadists. Farid
Benyettou was this charismatic “religious” leader who led the Kouachi brothers to
have a stricter vision of Islam and eventually led them on the path to Jihad.
Bucaille and Villechaise (2018) focused even further on Salafism and Muslim
youth in France. In their study they analyzed nineteen interviews from young
Muslims between the ages of 18 and 35 mostly from Algerian descent and to a lesser
extent of Moroccan descent. They lived in the urban project of Bordeaux. The
participants had a “Salifised” vision of Islam (p. 7) as well as set views on the
wearing of the veil, food practices and their personal culture true to Islam principles.
Their sense of belonging is aligned with the salifized vision. Their faith and its moral
codes are at the center of their lives. At first it seems that the expression of those
young Muslim’s faith is antithetic to the values of the Republic. However, Bucaille
and Villechaise (2018), found that their faith act more as a form of political protest,
challenging the inequalities and discrimination and the marginalization of Muslim
youth face.
Getting rid of substitute meal for Muslim student
To go further to establish more firmly the principle of laïcité, some schools
decided to remove substitute meals for children who do not eat pork. In a note sent to
parents, the Mayor of Chilly-Mazarin and a member of the political party Les
Républicains stated “La majorité municipale ne souhaite plus différencier la
composition des repas en fonction d'un interdit religieux qui relève de la sphère privée
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et familiale, en application du principe de laïcité”8 (Une 3e ville, 2015). The unilateral
decision was taken before the beginning of the school year. The only exception to this
rule would be in the case of a food allergy with a doctor’s note to prove said allergy
and in that case only could a substitute meal be served to the student. The mayor
insisted on the fact that school lunches were not mandatory. Other mayors from the
same political party also removed substitute meals on the same basis (Fischer & Le
Gohebel, 2015). However, in some instances the decision to remove the substitute
meals was overturned by the tribunal on the basis that it was not in the best interest of
the child (Feertchak, 2017).
Multiculturalism and the Republican School
The Republican school has a long tradition of being resistant to
multiculturalism as the principle of French universalism prevailed (Bleich, 2000).
During the immigration wave of the 1970s and 1980s the assimilationist concept
became obsolete and marked the beginning of the differentialist turn (Brubaker, 2001,
p. 531-532). Regions in France asked for the right to promote and strengthen regional
languages and cultures. Anti-Racist groups also advocated “the right to difference”
(Bleich, 2000, p. 59). Specifically, French born-citizens of North African descent
reclaimed their ethnic identity launching several anti-racist marches where “the
pendulum of antiracism appeared poised to swing toward an “American” model of
ethnic identification and race - or ethnicity-conscious politics as national level beur9
organizations sought to mobilize beur votes” (Bleich, 2000, p. 60). The children of
Muslim immigrants who did not speak French could benefit from the Enseignement

8

The political majority do not wish to differentiate the composition of the meals based on a religious
interdiction, which is a private family matter, anymore. This in an effort to apply the principle of
laïcité.
9

Beur is a colloquial term that refers to people whose parents are from the Maghreb.
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de langue et la culture d’origine (ELCO) program (akin to Teaching Content in the
Home Language) if they were a native of one of the countries participating in the
program.
Countries represented in the ELCO program are Algeria, Croatia, Spain, Italy,
Morocco, Serbia, Portugal, Tunisia, and Turkey (Eduscol, 2016). Those programs
were set up with the goal of the return of the immigrants to their home countries and
maintaining their home languages would facilitate their reintegration in their native
countries (Sayad, 1991; Scott, 2007). However, the “right to difference” and
differentialism did not continue. France reverted to an assimilationist approach trying
to erase differences while promoting French universalism and a color-blind society to
fight racism (Simon, 2006; Bleich, 2000).
Frenchness: Universalism and Assimilation
The concept of a French national identity as understood today emerged during
the French Revolution of 1789 and is rooted in French Republicanism. The Jacobin
Club, one of the most famous political organizations during the Revolution of 1789
and known for its revolutionary ideas, advocated for a highly centralized Republican
state as well as solid central powers (Rey, 1992). It laid the foundation for the concept
of Republicanism, which was more explicitly expressed in the French Constitution of
1958 in Articles 1 and 2:
France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall
ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race, or
religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It shall be organized on a decentralized basis…The
principle of the Republic shall be government of the people, by the people and for the
people.
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Scott (2007) noted that in order to provide equality before the law “that
equality is achieved, in French political theory, by making one’s social, religious,
ethnic, and other origins irrelevant in the public sphere; it is as an abstract individual
that one becomes a French citizen” (p. 11). Ernest Renan in his discourse “what is
nation” states: one confounds the idea of race with that of the nation and attributes to
ethnographic, or rather linguistic, groups a sovereignty analogous to that of actually
existing peoples” (p. 1). In short, “the basic or global French ideology” is as powerful
as it is simple, and devoid of concrete elements. At its base, it consists of a single
principle: the human subject as universal” (Dumont, 1994, p. 201), thus making the
precepts of universalism and assimilation two important aspects of French
republicanism.
Universalism, the “oneness and sameness of all individuals…taken to be the
antithesis of communalism” (Scott, 2007, p. 11), could be more specifically defined as
Knowledge, justice and personal development…found in the universal rather
than the particular; that the progression should be away from particular facts
towards universal laws, away from particular judgments towards general
principles, away from one's "parochial" origins towards a cosmopolitan
sensibility or the universal fellowship of the human spirit” (Boyle, 2000, p. 1).
Therefore, this notion of French national identity or “Frenchness” requires more than
immigrants’ simply integrating the French society into their own lives, but rather
completely assimilating into the French society in order to become French. National
identity prevails over group or religious identity and is achieved “not simply by
swearing allegiance to the nation but by assimilating to the norms of its culture”
(Scott, 2007, p. 13). Immigration patterns altered the ethnic composition of the French
population as well as the religious landscape of France. Islam became the second
religion of France. Interestingly, for Muslims to assimilate to the French society while
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retaining their faith, the government created the concept of French Islam to further
establish their Frenchness.
Frenchness and African Immigration
In order to gain a better understanding of the current presence of Muslims in
France and their status in the French society, it is important to look at African
immigration patterns. It is estimated that France’s total immigrant population is
around 11.8 million people, of which 4 million are from the Maghreb and 1 million
from sub-Saharan Africa (Borrel & Lhommeau, 2010). Political and economic
immigration started in the 19th century during the Industrial Revolution, mainly
attracting immigrants from Europe. Political refugees fleeing totalitarian regimes
found a safe haven in France (Hassell, 1991). Immigrants looking for better economic
opportunities also found France to be an attractive place as with World War I and
World War II the need for labor force increased. The immigration of African
immigrants was facilitated by colonization. As a matter of fact, as colonial
possessions, France could draw upon this readily available source of labor (Alba &
Silberman, 2002).
Algeria most particularly was an important source of immigration as it was
part of the departmental structure of France, and almost 2 million Algerians had
migrated to France by 1954 (Alba & Silberman, 2002). France exercised its control
over Algeria, deciding policies that would further promote the assimilation of Algeria.
For the French State, Algerians were French (Bradford, 1999). The French military
adopted a policy of forced assimilation where “the Algerian people were characterized
as ‘Muslim French,’ Algerian towns were infused with French-style architecture, and
there was a high degree of linguistic acculturation” (Wiles, 2007, p. 704), including
“the removal of the veil…an essential step in the French nationalist agenda to make
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Algeria French, for the veil was a visible barrier to the establishment of French
“indivisibility” (Bradford, 1999, p. 127).
The Algerian war of independence marked a turning point in the history of
French colonialism leaving both sides with deep-seated feelings of resentment. To this
day, the bitterness between French and Algeria persists. During the 2014 World Cup
of soccer, Marine Le Pen, the president of the National Front (a French ultraconservative political party) advocated for the withdrawal of the double nationality of
French citizens of Algerian descent. The most affected population was the Harkis,
those Algerians who worked for and fought with the French during the war. Once the
independence was won, the Harkis sought asylum in France, where they were placed
in camps sometimes for more than 20 years. The children of Harkis, who had fought
for the French, had to attend separate school, and were segregated from French
children including immigrant children of Algerian descents (Limaje, 2000).
Immigration from Morocco and Tunisia was a more recent phenomenon
starting in the 1960s and occurring on a much smaller scale. Unlike Algeria, Morocco
and Tunisia were simply protectorates. These countries benefited from greater
autonomy and thus were subjected to French assimilation policy to a lesser degree
with the consequence “of the development of an indigenous petite bourgeoisie in both
protectorates, a stratum that proved to be fertile soil for nationalism” (Alba &
Silberman, 2002, p. 1174). Besides, immigrants from Morocco and Tunisia were often
from a different socio-economic category than Algerians. When they migrated to
France, they were more likely to become small business owners (Limaje, 2000).
The immigration of sub-Saharan Africans also occurred on a much smaller
scale. Like Algerians, they were most likely to be recruited during the war such as the
tirailleurs sénégalais (Senegalese infantrymen). Bass (2014) rightly stated, “sharing
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French language, culture, and political history has left former colonies with similar
French institutional forms and ways of functioning (e.g., education, government) that
facilitate immigration to and integration within France” (p. 23).
Views of Muslims in France Since 2015
There are an estimated four to five million Muslims living in France. The
presence of Muslim immigrants in France is complicated historically (as a result of
events such as the Algerian War and the Harkis10) and currently by socio-geopolitical
events and movements including the attacks of January 7, 2015, colonialism (15341980), the Arab Spring (2010-2012) and the migration of 20,258 Tunisians between
January and March 2011 the majority of whom hoping to join France where they have
family (Boubakri and Spot, 2013, p. 11), globalization and transnationalism. AntiIslamic sentiments have always existed in France however, it was crystallized by the
2015 attacks. Public disdain became more widespread, obvious, and vehement. In the
aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks of January 2015, Manuel Valls,
member of the Socialist Party in France and Prime Minister of France at that time,
surprisingly declared in June 2015 during an interview, “we cannot lose this war
because it is a war of civilizations. It is our society, our civilization and our values
that we are defending” (Associated French Press, 2015). This declaration by the Prime
Minister who is a member of the Socialist Party was rather surprising as it was the
same concept used by the ex-Republican French president Nicolas Sarkozy, whose
values are in total opposition with the Socialist Party. However, Manuel Valls’
sentiments were reflected in an uptick of the unfavorable views of Muslims within the

10

During the Algerian War (1954-1962) the Harkis, Algerians who fought alongside France to
preserve the colonial system in place were in danger after the end of the War many moved to France
to avoid persecutions.
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French population and across some European countries. In fact, the Pew Research
Center in the United States revealed that unfavorable views of Muslims were on the
rise in Europe (See Figure 1). It was observed that France, while being perceived as
one of the more tolerant nations while being also greatly indifferent on matters of
multiculturalism and diversity (Taylor, 2016), showed a small increase of 5% in their
negative views of Muslims between 2015 and 2016.
Figure 1
Unfavorable Views of Muslims on the Rise in Europe

a

However, polls conducted by Ipsos, an opinion poll institute in France, presents
another view. In 2016, Ipsos published the results of a survey: Perceptions Are Not
Reality: What the World Gets Wrong. The survey was conducted in 40 countries and
included questions regarding the Muslim population in the respective countries. The
surveyed population was asked “out of every 100 people in their country, about how
many they thought were Muslim?” The results are presented in Figure 2, showing that
France ranked highest in believing that there were far more Muslims in France than
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there were. It could be argued that in the light of the recent attacks in France the
Muslim population has been at the center of excessive media exposure. In fact, it is
often highlighted in the media that France has one of the highest Muslim population
and Islam is the second religion in France, thus possibly explaining this belief.
However, as demonstrated by the results only 7.5 out of every 100 people are
Muslims in France.
Figure 2
Overestimating the Muslim Population.

Another Ipsos survey specifically conducted in France was commissioned by
the Foundation for a French Judaism regarding the vivre ensemble11 [live together]
after the terrorist attacks of January 2015. Interestingly, ethnic, or religious surveys
are usually prohibited in France (Simon, 2008, p. 67); nevertheless, Ipsos interviewed
a representative sample of the French population as well as a sample of people who
considered themselves Jewish and a sample of people who considered themselves

11

Vivre ensemble supposedly promotes social cohesion among a multicultural society, laïcité, the
republican school, and the equality of the regions.
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Muslim. The survey found that 53 percent of French people did not view immigration
as beneficial for France. In fact, 30 percent claimed that racism was justified in some
situations. The poll also showed that 53 percent declared that religious
fundamentalism was well implanted in France. Additionally, a considerable number
of French people opposed specific religious measures in public school: For example,
63 percent opposed alternative menus for Jewish and Muslim students, 71 percent
were against excused school absences based on religious holidays that are not in the
French calendar, and 74 percent were against veiled mothers as chaperones. Only
29 percent considered the Muslim population to be well assimilated into the French
population (Ipsos, 2016). This survey contrasts with the Pew Research Center survey
and the unfavorable perceptions of Muslims. While the increase of negative views
was only 5% in France, the Ipsos survey shows that negative views associated with
religion, most particularly Islam, are quite high.
An argument had been presented that private Muslim schools should be
established perhaps to address some of the challenges presented in the public schools
(Bowen, 2009). Interestingly, French people seem to oppose the creation of Muslim
private schools. Bowen posited that even though the creation of Muslim private
schools would solve the issues of the meal or religious holidays, it would also
reinforce their otherness and limit Muslim students’ contact with non-Muslim
students, thereby furthering their perceived difficulties with respect to assimilating
into French society (p. 448).
Muslim Youth in France
Muslims currently living in France are mostly from the ancient French
colonies in Africa. Many are the children of those immigrants and to a much lesser
extent to the Middle East. Those immigrants mostly live in derelict social housing
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built in the 1960s and 1970s to answer a demand in cheap labor (Windle, 2004,
p. 100). Second and third generation Muslims are still regarded as immigrants or are
often seen as not well assimilated into French society, even though they were born in
France, only speak French and had never been to their parents’ country of birth.
Croucher (2009) stated that French Muslims have often been criticized for not
speaking proper French (p. 307). The verlan, for example—a popular French slang—
is used by young people in the French projects as an identifier. Lefkowitch (1989)
noted, “Verlan as a spoken phenomenon originates in the working class,
immigrant-populated northern suburbs of Paris known as La Zone…Many of these
immigrants speak neither French nor their parents’ language well and have never seen
Paris. They are caught between cultures and have been forced to create their own” (p.
313). The children of Muslim immigrants who do not speak French can benefit from
the Enseignement de langue et la culture d’origine (ELCO) program (akin to
Teaching Content in the Home Language) if they are a native of one of the countries
participating in the program. Countries represented in the ELCO program are Algeria,
Croatia, Spain, Italy, Morocco, Serbia, Portugal, Tunisia, and Turkey (Eduscol, 2016).
However, the Investigative report of 2015 (S. Rep. No. 590, 2015), advised the
elimination of the ELCO program as a stand-alone program and its integration into
the foreign language program, a less intensive program. Muslim youth also have to
deal with being a visible minority in a France that struggles to deal with its immigrant
population (Keaton, 2005, p. 413). Beginning in the 1980’s the media started playing
a central role in the irrational fear and stigmatization of “immigrant youth” (Terrio, p.
93, 2009). The 1990’s was a turning point in the tough anti-crime measures
specifically targeting youth from the immigrant population. After the riots in the
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French projects, Nicolas Sarkozy, then prime minister expressed that we needed to
clean the projects with a Karcher, a popular brand of high-pressure cleaners.
More to the point, being African or Arab, or being identified as "black," has
never carried the same advantages in French society as being perceived and identified
as French, a racialized signifier of European ancestry and increasingly "white."
Further, this understanding has already been shown to determine access to better jobs,
schools, and neighborhoods, as well as ease of entering France or other Western
countries. (p. 414)
Young Muslim women faced another challenge. The headscarf debate and
more recently the burkini scandal. In Summer 2016 in the wake of the numerous
terrorist attacks, tension has been high. Thirty towns located on the sea prohibited
religious clothes on the beach (Smith & Rubin, 2016). Muslim women wearing the
burkini, a bathing suit that covers the body, have been asked to either remove the
garment, leave the beach, or fined (Quinn, 2016).
Identity Formation among Youth
One of the key developmental tasks during adolescence is forming a coherent
personal identity (Erikson,1968). During the adolescent stage, the young individual
will forge his identity as these “new identifications are no longer characterized by the
playfulness of childhood and the experimental zest of youth: with dire urgency they
force the young individual into choices and decisions which will, with increasing
immediacy, lead to commitments “for life” (Erikson, 1968, p. 155). The young
individual makes occupational and ideological commitments to become a productive
member of society. Therefore, those formative years are crucial and need to be
investigated. Campelo et al. (2018) studied the psychological and social profiles of
European youth willing to partake in radicalization. Campelo et al. (2018) reviewed
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22 qualitative and quantitative studies. A three-level model was developed to study
the phenomenon of radicalization “(1) individual risk factors include psychological
vulnerabilities such as early experiences of abandonment, perceived injustice, and
personal uncertainty; (2) micro-environmental risk factors include family dysfunction
and friendships with radicalized individuals; (3) societal risk factors include
geopolitical events and societal changes such as Durkheim’s concept of anomie” (p.
1). The profile of the Kouachi brothers fit that model. They became orphans at an
early age. They went to a youth center in the South of France effectively uprooting
them from everything and everyone they knew. Once they were old enough, they
returned to their childhood neighborhood. There they befriended Farid Benyettou and
became radicalized.
Research on Muslim Youth Identity
The following section explores research pertaining to Muslim youth identity in
a non-Muslim country.
Keaton (2005) examined national identity politics and what the author refers
to as arrogant assimilationism among 14 Muslim girls of African descent in the other
France. She found that while France aggressively pursued an assimilationist politics
mainly through national education, the lived experiences of these Muslims girls told a
different story. While they self-identify as French, how they are perceived in French
society differs greatly. They are still seen as others even if they were born in France
and had French citizenship. Moreover, if they wore visible religious signs such as the
headscarf they were identified as Muslim girls, religion becoming a strong marker for
their identity. Croucher et al. (2008) also found religion to be a strong identity marker
among Muslims. In their study they surveyed a total of 1198 participants both in
France (n= 600) and Britain (n = 598). The participants completed a 14-page survey
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based on Multigroup measure of ethnic identity and used a 4-point Likert-style scale
ranging from strongly agree to strongly disagree (p. 190). Results showed that ethnic
identification and religiosity were highly correlated in France (r =.75) and Britain (r
=.76) (p. 195). They contend that this could be attributed to “non- Muslim vehement/
aggressive attacks on Muslim identity and religion in both nations” (p. 195). This
study, like the Keaton’s study, also noticed the important aggressive assimilationist
policies through education most particularly in those results. Research on Muslim
youth identity in the aftermath of a terrorist attack were also conducted after 9/11.
Identification of Gaps and Limitations in the Literature
While there were a few studies focusing on Muslim youth in France, to the
researcher's knowledge there were no studies that focused on Muslim youth in Ile de
France et specifically from the same neighborhood as the perpetrators of the terrorist
attacks. The present study adds another perspective, a more in depth look into Muslim
youth who knew the perpetrators and who are also currently under surveillance,
adding another layer to the studied phenomenon. The biggest contribution of this
study is giving a voice to this marginalized group, whose voices are often left out of
the discussion about Muslim youth. This study also looks at the phenomenon through
a postcolonial and critical theory lens. Few studies took the postcolonial approach or
critical race theory.
Summary
The legacies of the French Revolution as well as the concept of Frenchness
were discussed. Laïcité and the Republican School are the two most important
legacies relating to this study. It shaped the curriculum and educational policies of
France’s educational system. Understanding the concept of Frenchness is of the
utmost important to understand some aspects of this study. This literature review also
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highlighted the theoretical framework informing this study. Postcolonial theory and
Critical race theory will be the lenses through which the data will be analyzed.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
This chapter focuses on the methodological aspect of the research. It will
address the purpose of the research questions, the research design, the participants and
sampling procedures, the data collection process, the data analysis, the researcher’s
role, validation strategies, trustworthiness as well as ethical considerations.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this case study was to investigate the negotiation of Muslim
youth identity in a post-Charlie Hebdo France. This qualitative study also examined
the effect of the attacks on educational policies. Chapter IV aimed at answering the
following questions alluded to in Chapter I:
1. How do Muslim youth construct their cultural identity?
2. What is the impact of laïcité in the construction of Muslim youth identity?
3. How did the terrorist attacks impact Muslims’ lived experiences?
4. How do the terrorist attacks impact educational policies?
Research Design
Merriam (1998) stated that qualitative research provides “the greatest promise
of making significant contributions to the knowledge base and practice of education,”
by focusing on “discovery, insight, and understanding from the perspective of those
being studied” (p. 1). This study examined the construction of the cultural identity of
Muslim youth in a post Charlie Hebdo Île de France. Thus, the use of a case study
was appropriate for this study, as Merriam (1998) noted, “A case study is employed to
gain an in-depth understanding of the situation and meanings for those involved”
(p. 19). Moreover, it “investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life
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context” (Yin, 1994, p. 19). By examining the formation of cultural identity of
Muslim youth in a post Charlie Hebdo Île de France, this study provided an in-depth
look and further our understanding of how Muslim youth construct their identity post
1/15 and the terrorist attacks, which deeply impacted the French community. The
research was conducted in Ile de France in the 19th arrondissement where the
Kouachi brothers were from.
Research Participants and Sample
Given the topic at hand, the participants were purposefully selected. In order
to identify the participants, purposeful sampling was selected as Merriam (2002)
states, “to understand the meaning of a phenomenon from the perspectives of the
participants, it is important to select a sample from which the most can be learned”
(p. 12). The first participant was approached and selected in the 19th arrondissement
outside of a public pool. Snowball sampling was also used to find more participants.
A recruitment screener was also used to select participants (see Appendix A).
The participants selection was determined by the following criteria: religious
background and ethnicity (self-identified). All selected participants must identify as
Muslims and had to either be French-born children of immigrants of African descent
or came to France as infants. All participants had to be from the 19th arrondissement.
Originally 12 interviews were conducted. However, four participants chose not to go
any further once we reached questions about religion. Therefore, eight full interviews
were conducted in the 19th arrondissement. They all attended school in the 19th
arrondissement. Among the participants, three of them were of Senegalese ancestry,
three of Malian descent, one of Ivory Coast descent and one of Algerian descent.
They all live in the 19th arrondissement. To ensure anonymity and confidentiality of
the participants, and given the sensitive nature of the topic, limited individual
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description is provided. It is important to note that a lot of participants had a Fiche S.
This was even more a reason to safeguard their anonymity. Instead, participants are
described using common characteristics. All participants are self-identified French
citizen children of African descent immigrants. They also self-identified as Muslims.
They all reported the importance of their faith.

Table 1.
List of Participants, Ethnic Origin and Age Range.
Participant (pseudonyms)

Ethnic origin

Age range

Issouf

Mali

18-25

Kouassi

Ivory Coast

26-35

Ousmane

Mali

18-25

Reza

Algeria/France

26-35

Amadou

Senegal

18-25

Ibrahima

Senegal

18-25

Boubacar

Mali

18-25

Assane

Senegal

18-25

Data Collection
Data collection took place in France. Individual interviews were the primary
research method. Semi-structured interviews were conducted to address research
questions one, two and three. Then, to address research question four, the section
continues with a document analysis from official documents such as bulletins, charter,
infographics found on the Ministry of Education Eduscol in the aftermath of Charlie
Hebdo.
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Table 2
Research questions and methods used to answer.

Semi-structured Interviews

Research Question 1: How do Muslim youth
construct their cultural identity?
Research Question 2. What is the impact of
laïcité in the construction of Muslim youth
identity?
Research Question 3. How did the terrorist
attacks impact Muslims’ lived experiences?

Documents

Research question 4. How do the terrorist
attacks impact educational policies?

Individual Interviews
The participants were interviewed on site. The interviews were only conducted
once because of time constraints and logistics. I had a limited time in France. It was
also very difficult to interview participants as a result of the sensitive nature of topic.
Even though participants were interested in the study and wanted to have their voices
heard they were hesitant to participate for fear of being targeted even more than they
already are in their everyday lives. The interview length was one hour maximum. The
interviews were conducted in participants’ native language, French, which is also the
researcher’s native language.
At the beginning of the interviews, I introduced myself as a French student
working on my doctoral dissertation. The project was explained in detail, as well as
the reasons for carrying such a project so that participants could understand why I am
undertaking such a task. Subjects would understand the crucial part they play in my
research. They were also informed of their rights to withdraw from the study at any
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point via a consent form (See Appendix C). The participants were also assured of the
protection of their identity.
The interviews were recorded with the verbal consent of the participants as
well as with their written consent. To protect anonymity, participants only agreed to
sign the IRB with their initials. Recording the interviews allowed the researcher to be
an active listener (Bogdan & Biklen, 2007). I explained the reasons for recording the
interview to the participants beforehand. Notes were taken as well (Gambold, 2010, p.
397). To elicit data an interview protocol was created. I used a non-directive style of
interviewing by using open-ended questions while avoiding to the best of my ability
leading questions (Roulston, 2008, p. 583). This allows the participants freedom in
expressing their feelings and attitudes regarding the topic at hand thus eliciting further
information (Ayres, 2008, p. 811).
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Table 3.
Participants Interview Sample Questions by Research Questions
Research Questions
How do Muslim
youth construct
their cultural
identity?

Questions
Do you identify and position yourself as a (parent
ethnicity—i.e., Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian etc.),
French, in-between or both? Have you always
identified yourself like this or did it change after the
terrorist attack?
Do you feel that people see you as French or do you
feel that they see you as other (parent ethnicity)?

What is the impact
of laïcité in the
construction of
Muslim youth
identity?
How did the
terrorist attacks
impact Muslims’
schooling
experiences?

● Can you define laïcité?
Is laïcité compatible with being a Muslim in France?

● Since the attack did you experience any difficulties
related to your background, such as discrimination,
stereotyping, or being misunderstood? How so?
● Since the attack have you felt excluded based on your
culture or religion? How so?
●
● What did you think about the attack of January 2015? Do
you understand the motivation of the terrorists? Do you
sympathize?
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Considering the primary questions, I prepared a set of semi-structured
interviews (See Appendix B). Those questions were generated from my readings of
post-colonial and critical race theory studies. The questions aimed to find out more
about the participants views on identity, Laïcité and the terrorist attacks of January
2015. I developed my questions to cover the issues I wanted additional information
on, and the questions that arose when I was watching the news regarding the attacks.
Questions also emerged from my conversation with my cousin. As he was telling me
the story a lot of questions came to my mind regarding the views of the participants
on the terrorist attacks. The questions for the semi-structured interviews were related
to the first three research questions about Identity, Laïcité and Terrorism (See
Appendix B). Then the questions were arranged according to the emergent themes as
follows:

Hybridity

•

•

Other/othering

•

•
•

Do you identify and position yourself as a (parent ethnicity
i.e, Algerian, Moroccan, Tunisian, etc.), French, in-between
or both? Have you always identified yourself like this or did it
change after the terrorist attack?
Does your life as one of the descendants of an African
immigrant from France create a hybrid (mix between two
cultures) and diaspora (the dispersion of any people from their
original homeland) identity?
Oftentimes we hear about integration of young Muslim into
French society even if they were born in France. Is the
successful “integration” in the French society a reason behind
the loss or negation of the Muslim/ African origin identity of
some Muslim youth (the Oreo effect)? What is the reason for
wanting to assimilate? (better job? a more anonymous life?
distancing oneself from the negative action of the terrorist?
etc?)
Do you feel that people see you as French or do you feel that
they see you as other (parent ethnicity)?
Since the attack did you experience any difficulties related to
your background, such as discrimination, stereotyping, or
being misunderstood? How so?
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Ethnicity

•
•
•

Identity
•

•

•

Culture

•
•
•
•

Cultural
education.

•
•
•

Religion

•
•
•
•

In terms of your background, how do you usually describe
yourself to people outside your community?
Do you feel as a unique person, or do you think that you
belong to a particular ethnic group?
Do you have any wish to go live in your parent’s birth
country?
What are the factors that make you identify yourself as (parent
ethnicity), French, or in between? And does that have a
relationship with being a French citizen?
Sometimes people describe themselves somewhat differently
to members of their own community. How do you describe
yourself to them?
Which part of your background do you feel closest to?
Sometimes this varies, depending on what aspect of your life
we are talking about. What about at home? Or at work? Or
with friends?
Do you think that keeping the (parent ethnicity) identity is an
opposition to the French culture, or it is self-determination?
How closely do you identify with and affiliate with your
culture?
Which culture do you identify with more?
How do you understand the surrounding culture and society
around you, and are you considered as a foreigner?
Does naming Muslim children in Muslim or Parent origin
names protect the Muslim (or parent ethnicity) identity in
France?
What is the impact of the French cultural encounter on your
Muslim identity?
Can you define laïcité?
What did you learn about laïcité at school?
Is laïcité compatible with being a Muslim in France?
What do you think about getting rid of substitute meal in
schools?
How important is religion to you? Why?
Since the attack have you felt excluded based on your culture
or religion? How so?
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Documents

To answer research question 4 documents on French educational policies as
well as documents on France’s educational system were analyzed. The documents
were obtained from the Ministry of National Education, Youth and Sports’ website.
Those documents discussed the French school’s curriculum mandates, administrative
policies, and existing programs. Those documents were collected in order to “help the
researcher uncover meaning, develop understanding, and discover insights relevant to
the research problem” (Merriam, 1998, p. 118). The documents gave additional
insight to how students were treated in the aftermath of the attacks.
Reflective Journal/Field Notes
Lastly, a reflective journal with field notes was used. Field notes are
paramount to effectively translating fieldwork into a case study (Gambold, 2010, p.
397). They provided additional data to be used for the analysis. The reflective journal
allowed me to note and describe the processes through which the researcher goes
through while conducting the study.
Data Analysis
Merriam (2002) noted that the act of analyzing data and collecting data should
be a simultaneous process (p. 14). It also requires moving “deeper and deeper into
understanding the data and making interpretation of the larger meaning of the data”
(Creswell, 2003, p. 190). The interviews were first transcribed by the researcher. Then
Microsoft Word files were created to organize the data collected. The files were
organized using pseudonyms to protect the identity of the participants. To protect the
confidentiality of the data, only the researcher has access to it, and it is stored in the
researcher’s personal password protected computer.
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To answer the research questions posed, semi-structured interviews were
conducted. Eight participants answered questions about identity, religion, secularism,
schooling, and the terrorist attacks. The interviews were recorded using an audio
recording device then transcribed into word documents. The interviews were then
translated from French to English by the researcher. Once the interviews were
translated, I started the coding process. The interviews were coded. The coding
process allows the researcher to establish connections of meaning during the data
analysis process. According to Lockyer (2004) coding is “A systematic way in which
to condense extensive data sets into smaller analyzable units through the creation of
categories and concepts derived from the data” (p. 137). The researcher has to
extrapolate the central meaning of the data and then give it an appropriate code, which
will in turn contribute to deeper understandings and development of themes, and
concepts. The coding process could be seen as a systematic process of deconstruction
and reconstruction of data which would help to provide viable answers to research
questions and understand a case more in depth; ergo the what and the why. Coding is
progressive in nature and requires sorting and defining of the data collected as
applicable to the research purpose (Glesne, 2006).
I used the computer program Atlats.ti 8 to proceed with the analysis. A priori
coding was used for the first cycle of the coding process. Saldana (2015) stated “a
provisional list of codes should be determined beforehand to harmonize with your
study’s conceptual framework or paradigm, and to enable an analysis that directly
answers your research questions and goals” (p. 49). I developed the main codes, using
the postcolonial and critical race theoretical framework that guided the study. The
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main codes used were (1) Hybridity, (2) Other/Othering, (3) Subaltern, (4) Identity,
(5), Culture, (6) Colonial education, (7) Language and (8) Ethnicity.
I read through the interviews multiple times to see what other words or ideas
emerged from the readings to find smaller themes that could be grouped under the
larger main themes. Lastly the final reading was meant to connect the themes
uncovering the similarities and differences among the themes. Instead of the names
being referred to, a colored schema was used throughout. Each participant was
assigned a color as follows:

Table 4
Colored Schema for Each Participant

Participants

Issouf
Kouassi
Ousmane
Reza
Amadou
Ibrahima
Boubacar
Assane
Gaëlle

I also included myself in the table as one of the “participants.” While interviewing
the participants as a researcher I either asked more details or also interjected my voice
with the participants about some shared experiences.
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Document Analysis
This type of analysis according to Merriam (1998) can help ground the
investigation according to the context of what is being investigated (p. 126). To select
the documents, I examined different criteria: date of publication, document source,
and content:
The date of publication. The documents had to be published after the terrorist
attacks. If they were published before they had been updated to address the attacks.
The source of the document. Most of the documents came from official
government websites. On those websites external resources approved by the
government as resources that could be used by the educational body were linked. I
looked at those resources as well since they were official recommended materials.
Content. I read the different educational documents and took notes on the
excerpts relevant to the research questions. I selected documents whose content
directly related to the response to the terrorist attacks in the educational setting.
Background of the Researcher and Confronting Subjectivity
I am a French native woman; whose parents are from the French Caribbean
island of Guadeloupe. I was born and grew up in France. I remember vividly my
schooling experience and those of my classmates especially those of immigrant
descent. The relationship with teachers and school administrators was not always
easy. As a woman of color, I have numerous anecdotes with negative racial or
religious undertones.
Given my background, I understand subjectivity is an issue that has to be
guarded against throughout the study as “one’s subjectivity is like a garment that
cannot be removed. It is insistently present in both the research and the non-research

78

aspects of our life” (Peshkin, 1988, p. 17). In order to check for any possible biases or
prejudices and subjective opinions that might negatively affect the study, the use of a
reflective journal is a useful tool (Peshkin, 1988). Through this medium I was able to
keep track of my thoughts and feelings and research-related concerns. During data
collection and analysis, the journal enabled me to reflect and provide a space to record
questions that may arise pertaining to both personal feelings and matters related to the
process of conducting the study. Given my particular position as a researcher but also
as being from the same neighborhood and experiencing similar experiences as the
participants I had to consider my assumptions and reflections to ensure that what was
reported was actually what happened and not what I though happened (Rubin &
Rubin, 2005).
Trustworthiness
In qualitative research, maintaining trustworthiness is integral to the process.
A variety of methods were used to ensure trustworthiness of this study. Guba and
Lincoln (1981) proposed four aspects to assess the soundness of a study: credibility,
transferability, dependability, and confirmability.
Credibility was established by continuing extensive background reading on
qualitative research and research methods prior to conducting the study. According to
Yin (1994) this allows the researcher to incorporate the correct operational measures
for the focus of the study. Throughout the study reflexivity was employed as a means
of controlling or limiting subjectivity as it related to what was being read and
observed, while keeping in focus the research process (Glesne, 2006). This was done
through the reflective journal. The use of multiple sources such as educational
documents, curriculum, policies, surveys was also employed to strengthen credibility
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(Shenton, 2004). A range of documents were used as a means of verifying
experiences and viewpoints against each other so that a rich picture of the perceptions
of the group being studied could be established based on what was shared by a range
of people.
Debriefing sessions with professors as well as peer scrutiny was also part of
the process. Shenton (2004) stated that a “fresh perspective…may allow [such
individuals] to challenge assumptions made by the investigator…[and that] questions
and observations may well enable the researcher to refine his or her methods, develop
a greater explanation of the research design and strengthen his or her arguments in the
light of comments made” (p. 67). Debriefing and peer scrutiny sessions were done
throughout the study. Moreover, the use of quotations was used as a means of
presenting the ‘voice’ of the subjects of the study as opposed to simply the
interpretations by the researcher of what was said and or recorded.
Dependability was established through the use of an audit trail as it “provides
a mechanism for retroactive assessment of the conduct of the inquiry and a means to
address issues related to the rigor of the research as well as the trustworthiness of the
results” (Rodgers, 2008, p. 44). All documents related to the research were conserved.
Regarding transferability, Merriam (1995) stated, “the extent to which the
findings of one study can be applied to other situations, refers to external validity, or
generalizability” (p. 57). Thick description of the case being studied will be one
means to attempt to facilitate transferability. The use of purposeful sampling was the
other means to increase the transferability of the study. The participants were chosen
because they best fit the purpose of the study.
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Confirmability “is concerned with providing evidence that the researcher's
interpretations of participants' constructions are rooted in the participants'
constructions and also that data analysis and the resulting findings and conclusions
can be verified as reflective of and grounded in the participants' perceptions” (Jensen,
2008, p. 113). Here as well the use of multiple sources, reflective journaling, and
audit trail were used to ensure confirmability.
Ethical Considerations
It is the responsibility of the researcher to take into account any ethical issues
that may occur during the study. The researcher must ensure that participants are
protected and therefore will conduct the research in accordance with the guidelines of
Florida International University Institutional Review Board. A trusting, respectful
relationship with the participants was established. Participants were reminded that
they could withdraw their participation from the study at any moment. They were also
reminded that they had the choice to not answer questions that might make them feel
uncomfortable. An ethical challenge associated with this study was the risk for
participants to be reluctant to share their opinions given the particular topic at hand. It
was of the upmost importance to maintain the confidentiality of the participants and
ensure their anonymity.
Summary
This chapter outlined the case study design that was used in this study. Young
Muslims who identify as Muslims and French-born children of immigrants of African
descent were selected to participate in this study. The focus was on how they
identified themselves in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks. Semi-structured
interviews were conducted face to face in France and all interviews were recorded and
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transcribed verbatim, then translated in English by the researcher. Data were analyzed
using a qualitative lens.
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CHAPTER IV-A
FINDINGS
Chapters IV-A and IV-B aim to present the findings from the research
questions.
Within Chapter IV-A I explored the following research questions:
1. How do Muslim youth construct their cultural identity?
2. What is the impact of laïcité in the construction of Muslim youth identity?
3. How did the terrorist attacks impact Muslims’ lived experiences?

To accomplish this exploration, I conducted semi-structured interviews.
This chapter focused on the participants and their responses to the interview
questions.
I also conducted document analysis to understand the response of the
government post Charlie-Hebdo, results of which are presented in Chapter IV-B.
Chapter IV-B looked at documents from the government’s Education website as well
as the resources listed on the website to accompany teachers in their journey to
explain the terrorist attacks of January 2015.
Originally 12 interviews were conducted. However, four participants chose
not to go any further once we reached questions about religion. Therefore, eight full
interviews were conducted in the 19th arrondissement. In order to gain in-depth
understanding a case study approach was used. Postcolonial theory and critical race
theory were the theoretical lenses applied to this case study. These lenses offer a
different theoretical perspective to address the dislocation of Eurocentrism in
predominant ideas of Western, identity, culture, science, and education, while giving a
voice to people of color (Ashcroft, Griffiths & Tiffin, 1995).
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Interviews
First, I explored the negotiation of a Muslim youth identity and their lived
experiences, including their educational experiences when relevant, following the
terrorist attacks of January 2015 in France. The different participants who were
attending or attended a secondary school in the 19th arrondissement experienced a
similar process of identity negotiation where ethnicity, culture, faith, and race
intersect. The participants, though cautious given the political climate and the nature
of the topic, were eager to share their experiences and how they constructed and
negotiated their identity. Some answered the questions with details while showing the
depth of their reflection on the subject matter. Other participants, on the other hand,
were quite brief in their answers as though they did not want to share too much of
anything that could seem as causing dissension and disturbing the status quo. Even
though their views and voices provided this study with diverse and rich data, as their
stories were eerily similar, common themes quickly emerged.
Two main themes emerged from the data: (a) the importance of Islam in
participants’ lives and (b) the intersection of their Muslim identity, their ethnic origin,
and their French citizenship.
Regarding Islam, all participants expressed its importance in their life even
when they declared themselves as not being very religious. Being Muslim is part of
who they are, their essence. However, the practice of Islam is of the personal domain
or a personal choice. Culturally all participants identified as being close to the culture
of their ethnic background but also being closed to the French culture. The consensus
among several participants was that the French Republic, as well as the media,
promoted negative views of Muslims.

84

The participants stated the importance of their ethnic heritage and their parents’
upbringing in the formation of their identity. Negative views from French society in
general, as well as a strong family influence, contribute to reinforcing feeling closer to
their ethnic background according to participants. Participants mentioned that even
though they did not feel being Muslim was incompatible with being a member of the
French society, they asserted that being Muslim is seen as a failure toward fully
integrating in the French society.
In this section, the results are a report of the interview findings collected from
eight participants. For research questions 1 to 3 the semi-structured interviews
focused on the following themes: (1) Hybridity, (2) Other/Othering, (3) Subaltern,
(4) Identity, (5), Culture, (6) Colonial education, (7) Language and (8) Ethnicity.
Research Question 1: How do Muslim youth construct their cultural identity?
Hybridity and Identity
Hybridity can be defined as “new transcultural forms that arise from crosscultural exchange. Hybridity can be social, political, linguistic, religious, etc. It is not
necessarily a peaceful mixture, for it can be contentious and disruptive in its
experience. The process of hybridization can take many forms: It can be linguistic,
cultural, political” (Ashcroft et al., p. 108). Bhaba (1994) states that this process takes
place in the “Third space of enunciation” (p. 37). Recognizing this third space of
enunciation in the construction of cultural identities would “open the way to
conceptualizing an international culture, based not on the exoticism of
multiculturalism or the diversity of cultures, but on the inscription and articulation of
culture’s hybridity (Bhabha, 1994, p. 38).
Identity can be defined as “the way in which an individual and/or group
defines itself. Identity is important to self-concept, social mores, and national
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understanding. It often involves both essentialism and othering” (Key Terms, n.d)
Identity is a recurrent topic in postcolonial theory and more specifically the notion of
“self”. Identity is the way an individual or a group of people defines itself. It is
important when it comes to the concept of “self”, social values, and national
understanding. In colonial discourse the “self is “coherent, bounded, individualized,
intentional, the locus of thought, action, and belief, the origin of its own actions, the
beneficiary of a unique biography” (Rose 1998, p. 3). A person’s identity is related to
how they understand and perceive themselves.
Following is an examination of the ways in which participants perceived
their cultural identities. Participants were asked if their lives as descendants of
African immigrants born or raised in France created a hybrid identity. Kouassi the
second participant interviewed offered an interesting answer about his cultural
identity. His parents are from Ivory Coast:
I would identify myself a little more like both, a little of both, so Afro
European I could say. Because here in France we are accused of having this
skin color, but we have origins that are extra European that are not in
Europe. And on the other hand, in Africa we are called the little white man.
So, there is a paradox, so we do not know too much. I would say I feel more
African anyway. Ivory Coast (origin of parents). Here there is a lot of
hypocrisy. You can see me as French when you follow the World Cup like
Paul Pogba Ngolo Kante. They don’t see you as French when you go to
prison or when you work at the post office. That is the problem. But in both
cases in the worst and in the best, we must see you as a Frenchman.
(Kaoussi, July 2019).
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Kaoussi’s statement about identity was echoed in other participants’
perceptions of their identity. They find themselves at the crossroad of being and
feeling French but also identifying as the ethnicity of their parents. Ousmane, Assane,
Ibrahima and Amadou expressed that they felt their culture was a mix of the French
culture and the culture of their parents. Examples of comments included the
following:
Yes, it creates a hybrid culture.
Me? It is a bit of both. Although I have Malian parents, I lived almost all my
life in France. I still have a certain French identity but really, I know that I my
heart goes towards Mali more, which is my homeland because when I am in
France for example, we don't have the same mentality at all as Malians in
Mali, even if I speak with Malians from the village. For example, marriage.
Getting married to a woman from Mali is going to be more difficult than
getting married with a French Malian from France. We are in a society where
we have mixed everything, and our identity is very sparse, very fragmented.
Assane’s answer also conveyed that dual identity:
Yes, a bit of both when we go over there, we are French they call us French
when we are here sometimes, we are called foreigner, and I was born in
France. I live in France I feel more French than Senegalese. When I'm at
home it's Senegal. French at work. We adapt.
Well, as French, but I'm Senegalese too. Where I live, I live in France. I work
in France. However, I have family in my home country, so I go there. So, both
so that means yeah.
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So, I'm French I'm 2000% French and I'm 2000% Algerian. When I'm in France I'm
French when I'm in Algeria I'm Algerian. Both. But I think I am more French

culturally speaking.
Issouf and Kouassi expressed that though they were feeling French their
parents ethnic background still influenced how they perceived their cultural identity.
Me? A little more French because I was born in France. I was born in France
and I lived in France, I did everything in France and yeah, I live it (the Malian
culture) every day. It is my parents. I grew up with both, but more French.
Sometimes we are even more French than French who are born in Spain or
wherever, they say they are French but us we are born in France.
To be honest I accept some aspects of the French identity, but I do not accept
it 100% because if I accepted it 100% it means to deny our other origin and
that's what they want some of them. That's what they would like me to do I
cannot deny the origin of my parents, to agree to be French and after when
I'm French I'm told "hey but you're still African".
Boubacar on the other hand expressed that his culture was more French;
however, it was still deeply infused with the culture of his parents.
French, since they lived here. They were born here. I was born here. I have
French citizenship.
The participants recognized the influence of their parents’ cultural
background, but because they were born and raised in France, they felt that the French
culture was the dominant culture in their life. They share a collective identity with
French culture and a sense of belonging to French society by being born and raised in
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a French society. Their French identity is either connected to their citizenship or
education:
In fact, I was born here. I am French.
I have dual citizenship.
I'm French because I have my papers.
I was born in France. And I lived in France, I did everything in France.
I was born here. I have French citizenship.
The fact that we grew up in France, that we have a European education
However, they express their sense of belonging to their parents’ ethnic culture
and embracing that identity, as well. Other participants expressed that they felt closer
to their parents’ cultures, as stated below:
[I identify more with the] African culture. I do not eat pork; I don’t drink
wine. It’s the French culture, isn't it?
Yes. Malian culture.
Kouassi gets a little more specific about the process of hybridization and how
he came to have a culture where both the French culture and the culture from his
parents mixed. He explained:
The situation in France and even what happened before. That is to say the
colonial past of our country where we live in France. We know they did a lot
of damage in our countries and that's because of that, it's what drove our
parents to come here. Otherwise, if everyone respected the laws of each
country. Back home our parents receive 5000/6000 euros [distorted notion of
income in Africa]. They would not be here [in France]. So, there is a lot of
injustice. We are criticized for something they started.
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Interestingly the colonial past of France greatly contributed to the process of
otherization.
Other/Othering/Self-Otherization and Identity
Other can be defined as “the social and/or psychological ways in which one
group excludes or marginalizes another group” By declaring someone Other, persons
tend to stress what makes them dissimilar from or opposite of another, and this carries
over into the way they represent others, especially through stereotypical images” (Key
Terms, n.d) In other words, the colonizers define themselves as the norm and the
people they conquered as others. They see them as less than them and as a people to
subjugate, to civilize. Even when they have been civilized, they are still considered as
others. Participants pointed out that feeling of being othered and considered as a
foreigner even though they were born and raised in France. When asked if they were
considered as foreigners by other French people, Kouassi felt strongly about that
question. The volume of Kouassi’s voice increased as he expressed the following:
Of course, in France we are still seen, we won’t say as “foreigners” but in
any case, not very far from that. Second class French citizen. That is how they
see us [referring to white French people], that is the reality. It must be said
one must not be afraid. Some under the effect of integration, they want to
integrate so much that they will say “no! the French people, they are all
good” [some Muslims want to assimilate so they won’t speak negatively about
French people], but no, it must be said. [...]Even before I say what I am, they
have already defined what I am.
Amadou, on the other hand, wanted to reaffirm his Frenchness despite being
seen as a
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stranger in the eyes of some French people but I'm French because I have my
papers. So, it's when we see you. Is that it? Yeah, when they see me, they will
say yeah, he's an African, not that he is French directly.
For Assane, Boubacar, Issouf and Ousmane, their race had everything to do
with how they were perceived, as they stated:
Like a stranger, because of the color of my skin”
Yes because of the color of the skin.
Well like a stranger. Because the skin color says a lot of things. Yeah, after if
we show them our ID yeah […] Just by looking, they will say it's an
immigrant. They do not know where we come from.
I do not feel that through their eyes I am also French. To a white person, they
will say "Ah, he is French!" But me they are probably going to doubt "oh this
one must be of Malian origin. He is of African origin; he does not come from
here ". I am totally considered a stranger. There is no doubt. The only day
they tried to hug me was in the subway during the day of the World Cup. At
that moment we were all French. Ngolo kante ngolo kante. Everyone loved
black, Arabs, everyone loved each other that day.
When asked further questions about otherization, Kouassi pointed out that I
had to be more specific when asking the question about who does the otherization. He
declared:
Very good question, madam. When you say, do people see me as “French or
other?” who are the people you are talking about? Is it the whole French
population? Outside the Muslim community and the Black community? You
must be honest. People, they see me as outside of these communities
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[mentioned], an African. You must be honest. But I'm proud I do not see the
problem. I'm African.
However, Reza, Ousmane, Assane and Kouassi also pointed out that the
process of otherization took place in their own community of origin. When they visit
their parents' countries of origin, the local population do not see them as totally one of
their own. The examples below give more insights into that phenomenon:
I am a foreigner here. I am a foreigner in Algeria.
In Mali we are not really Malian.
When I go on vacation [back home], I am French [...] when we go over there,
we are French. They call us French.
In Africa we are called the little white man. So, there is a paradox.
To delve deeper into the question of otherization, I asked participants how
they described themselves to other French people. Based on their answers, they
seemingly indicated that they fully integrated the concept of otherization to the point
of self-otherization in some instances. Some examples of the comments describing
that process included the following:
Most of the time I will say directly that I am Malian. I mean of Malian origin.
Madame, if I said I have papers, you know I have French papers. If they see
me walking and they say to me "Where do you come from?" I'm not going to
tell them I'm from France. I'm going to tell them directly the origin because
that is what they are waiting for. They see my skin and they know. They
categorize me as "No, he is not French; he comes from somewhere else. He is
a foreigner.”
I am Black, I live in the hood, but I am French like you.
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Even before I say what I am, they have already defined what I am. This is also
the problem. When I speak with real French people who have white skin, they
will tell me that maybe I [did not finish his sentence]. Last time there was a
lady who asked me the question "what is your origin?" I told her I was from
[…], and I lied to her, I told her I am West Indian so she would leave me
alone. But she said to me “but sir where are you from?” First, I said French
after she pushed me to say West Indian. Yet she repeated "what is your
origin?" Well now I will tell you the truth I am African, West African Ivory
Coast. But you understand the question [he speaks to me]. On three occasions
she told me, sir, where are you from? For her there are French people yes but
there are those of French descent. When you said French it was not enough as
if it was necessary to specify? You must justify yourself. It is according to their
goodwill whether they accept it or not. There is also money that plays a role
whether we are French Muslims black or Arab when we live in the 92, we are
well seen. In Boulogne over there. Money makes everyone agree.
So, if it's a French person I say I'm French. And what do they say? They have
nothing to answer because when necessary, I can use a proper speech [he
means he speaks standard French] When it’s an African I’m African, when it’s
an Arab I’m Arab. At the same time, the Maghreb is in Africa.
Assane on the other hand expressed the confusion as to how to identify
himself to others:
When I go on vacation, I am French. But afterwards there are some who
recognize between Senegalese. But compared to a French person how do you
describe yourself? I don't know because sometimes it gets on their nerves
when we say that we are French. For example, when we go to the police and
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all that, they tell us a random country to make fun of us. They like to laugh at
us. It doesn't bother us; we're used to it.
Ousmane explained that this self-otherization was also a result of other’s
perceptions of the participant identity:
It's clearly people's view of me. It's really the perception that we are given.
Some of the factors in participants identification with their parents’ ethnic background
was language and parental education.
Language and Parental Influence on Identity Formation
Language is often a terrain for both colonization and resistance. Language was
used to spread the values and ideals of the colonial empire. Speaking the mother
tongue was repressed violently in some instances. Speaking about that repression,
Brubaker (2001) wrote “the school teachers of the French Third Republic, notorious
for shaming and humiliating those who spoke languages or dialects other than
standard French” (p. 533).
Speaking the native tongue became an act of resistance and affirmation of
one’s appurtenance to an ethnic group. Jaspal and Cinnirella argued (2011)
that participants reproduced representations of ‘ethnic authenticity’ by
emphasizing the importance of the heritage language as a marker of ethnic
identity. The acceptance and reproduction of this social representation enabled
individuals to affirm their own membership in the ethnic group, given that
they claimed to possess the crucial self-aspect for inclusion in the group (i.e.
knowledge of the heritage language) (p. 516).
Issouf and Assane both noted the use of their native language and the role it had on
their sense of belonging and identity formation:
Since I was very little at home, I speak Malian with my parents, as I can speak
French with my sisters. I go out, I speak French. With friends who speak the
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same language as me sometimes to tease each other we will speak Malian, you
see.
At home it is Senegal, we speak the language. But sometimes we mix it up a
bit.
Assane and Ousmane also pointed out that their parents’ education and transmission
of their culture played an important role in them feeling close to their parent’s culture.
I have the culture of Senegal. I know a lot of things, stories.
When it comes to education as a person my parents educated me more [...] I
don’t have a French culture when it comes to education. The Malian culture in
relation to my parents, in relation to the education I received, the stories I
heard when I was very young about Mali. My parents were born in the village,
they were not going to tell me stories about Clovis. Even if we talked about it
at school, my culture is totally Malian.
Besides, participants also viewed their connection to their parents’ ethnic
background as a way to assert oneself and cement their ethnic identity by embracing
their parents’ values, tradition, and education. When answering the question about if
keeping the parent ethnic identity was an opposition to the French culture or was it
self-determination Kouassi, Boubacar, Reza, Amadou, Assane, and Ibrahima saw it as
a way to assert one’s identity:
For some I would say that it is more a way to assert oneself. We went to
school and they taught us the story of Napoleon, but we are black.
One way to assert yourself. I would never deny everything my parents taught
me. Because the person I am today is because of my parents who gave me
these values, this education, this respect for people.
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It's a plus for France if they don’t understand that… If we were all doctors,
how would we do it? And well it's the same for identity. We are all different,
and it is this difference that makes France one of the most beautiful countries.
A way to assert oneself.
It's a way of opposing to show that it's more the same than before, because it's
not the color that makes the nationality
It is to affirm that I am Senegalese.
Religion and Identity
The impact of French cultural encounters on Muslim identity affected the
participants in different ways. For Issouf, Reza, Boubacar, and Assane French culture
did not really have an impact on their faith. They said that they were able to separate
their French identity and culture from their Muslim identity by practicing prayer at
home, as stated here:
Well, it is going well. You must separate things. Go to work. Do a little bit of
everything. And we come back home, and we do the prayer
None. I had a religious education from a very young age even before the
religious phenomenon was a “hype” phenomenon. Islam has no issues with
the laws of the republic. You practice your religion. If we talk about pensions
it is (speaks in Arabic), the isolated woman (speaks in Arabic). Besides, one of
the first laws that we learn at ENA12 is a law of Mohammed.
It’s compatible.
It's normal. it’s just that there are a lot of French people who find it difficult to
accept the Muslim religion.

12

ENA or Ecole Nationale d’Admisnistration is an elite school that trains future French presidents.

96

On the other hand, Kouassi, Ousmane, Amadou, and Ibrahima felt that the
French culture was a bit incompatible with their Muslim faith because they do not
understand it. Often, they found that the media was the main culprit in terms of
projecting a distorted image of Islam to the non-Muslim French population:
Yeah, it's a problem. Yes, it has an impact even a very big one. One issue here
is that there is a problem with the media [...] The problem is that the media
overwhelms us, they accuse us. “Oh, there is a problem with Muslims” Every
day we say there is a problem with Muslims. Every day there is a problem with
Muslims here in France. I do not know why. Somebody explains it to me!
There are advantages and disadvantages. We are in a country where there is a
lot of diversity. So even at the level of Islam, there are Muslims everywhere,
other countries, etc., and in France, we can see that there is still a certain
freedom. We have a certain freedom of worship etc., but there are still a lot of
stigmatizations among the French who increasingly reject Islam. In France
you can see through the media. They are focusing a bit on Islam. As soon as
there is a problem or something, we will put an Islamic scandal to drown
everything in the mix. It’s quite strange.
It's not compatible. There is a clash.
Yes, there is a little clash with Muslims and Christians.
Participants were then asked if successful integration meant the loss or
negation of the Muslim/African origin identity for some Muslim youth. What would
be the reasons behind assimilation and if they would do what it takes to assimilate?
For Issouf, Kouassi, Ousmane and Reza the answer was a resounding no:
Not at all [laugh] On the contrary if I am given the choice, I take away my
French nationality and I keep the Islam.
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Madam I can answer in all honesty if to assimilate it is to have a better job or
to be seen like them in their eyes, madam, so assimilation does not interest me.
We must respect everyone as they are. Here in France, there are Portuguese,
even Jews everyone came, and we respected them. There is a problem with us.
They blame us for choosing this religion. So maybe if we are not Muslims
anymore and maybe if we eat pork and we drink wine maybe we will be
accepted. But no, they will always blame us for something. We are proud to be
Muslim.
Personally, I would never deny my Muslim identity for money etc. Religion is
more important to me than the French identity we will say. We try and I quote
to make us "sell out". Oreos. They want all our education, our way of doing
things, to be French, but before doing that they would have to explain to me
what the French identity is. I would like to know how they define a good
French person, because even that they never told us. For example, is it eating
bread? On anti-terrorist posters, they would say ok if you notice people who
don't eat too much, who no longer watch TV, who dress a certain way, who
starts to have a long beard etc., let us know. If that is what is meant by
not being French, it’s vague. While supposedly it is to be a welcoming land.
It's a bit of a spiel. They welcomed us to change us or? The day they define the
concept of a good French well, we will talk.
So, the term integration; I don't accept it. I can't accept it. I know that I have a
French culture and that I was born in France. In fact, I am French by filiation.
My father is Algerian. In addition to that fact, my mother is French by blood.
I don't see integration. For me it’s not about the person. As long as she or he
respects the laws of the republic, you can't talk to me about integration. You
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went to school in France, you work in France, you have studied in France, you
have a French culture. For the most part when they go to their home country,
they are French. They have no culture [Arabic culture], they can't speak
Arabic, they can't write it, they can't read it. I’m lucky to have both cultures.
I'm proud of it. I am as much Algerian as I am French. You can't talk to me
about integration. For me when we talk about integration to an immigrant or
an immigrant's child, I find it disgusting. French history since Napoleon is a
melting pot. We had the Germans, the Arabs, the Ottomans, the Spanish, the
Italians. So really in France who is really French. We are French because we
follow the laws of the republic, we respect the laws of the republic, because we
consider ourselves French. I find that the media play a lot on integration. You
can't talk about integration [when your children were born here].
On the other hand, Amadou and Assane felt that assimilating was the way to
follow in order to leave a peaceful life in France.
I think we must ignore that. For example, when you go to work you will not
show that you are Muslim you see. You make abstraction of all that, you go
about your day quietly and after you practice [your religion]. It does not help
to show people that you are Muslim you will be frowned upon. It's stupid. Ok
there are some who shows it but. So, for people to consider you as integrated,
you do not have to show your culture, you do not have to show that you're
Muslim is that? As French in the eyes of people. And then in the eyes of your
relatives you show that you are Muslim. But outside you must keep an image.
To have a better job, at school. But even in everyday life the Muslim religion is
frowned upon because of terrorism. So, it means you must not show it, do not
deny it, but do not show that you are Muslim, but without denying it.
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Maybe they have a hard time getting accepted.
Participants were also asked about the naming of Muslim children or Parent’s
origin was a way to protect Islam or parents’ ethnic identity in France?
It is a way to assert oneself and it is a way of detaching oneself too. I know I
was born in France I am interested in the history of the country. I know that
before when Bonaparte was there and even afterwards, it was necessary to
pick names from the Christian calendar, but why do they want to force us to
pick names from the Christian calendar, but no, that's not our identity. And I
will answer a slightly more general question even in Africa Christianity is not
their general identity. That's all.
Yes. I think our parents gave us [names] according to our grandparents, what
they were named. For them it's a certain value. We must not forget that
Muslim names have a meaning, an aura for us. For us it’s not just a name. I’m
not going to call my child John when I have no attachment to Christianity. It's
not that I don't want to do it, but why I'm going to call my children John. We
give a name to a person so that their name conveys something, which brings
something to our parents, love. We are not going to call our children John. I
believe it’s Chinese immigrants who do that (adopting the name of the country
they live in) . For me it’s misrepresents oneself, it’s a travesty. No, I come as I
am. You accept me as I am if you accept me in the country, I am aware it is
necessary to work hard, I must respect your laws etc. But let me live in peace.
It's freedom.
A name is something that is chosen. I have my father's name. For me it’s a
pride so why choose a name in the calendar. Fatoumata is beautiful,
Mohammed is beautiful, and Jean is beautiful, and Riley is beautiful. Why if it
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is a name that comes from the United States, we do not talk about it a lot but if
it is a name that is African sounding it is not accepted.
Yes yes, it is the way. But in any case, in our religion when you have a child
you must give it a Muslim name. It's part of our religion and we cannot give a
Muslim child a French name. It's not compatible with the religion.
After the parents. Originally
Yes, we must call our child with a Muslim name
Lastly participants were asked how important religion was to them. They all
expressed the importance of religion in their lives.
Ah, we must think about the beyond. We are just passing. We must think about
the day after the judgment.
Religion is paramount. Any man who has no religion is lost; he is doomed to
fail in his life. You can have billions, but it's a total failure if he does not have
something he must follow, no path that guides him.
This is the priority of my life. I cannot be religious and say that there is not a
superior being. That is to say a superior being to whom I owe everything and
tell myself that it is not important. For me it’s the number one thing. God is
higher than anything. So, I can't afford to put society, money, my life etc
before my beliefs and convictions. For me this is the most important thing. As
soon as I get up in the morning, I say to myself it's thanks to God. So, I say to
myself all day long I have to try to do my best and every day like that I have to
do my best. I can't forget God for a moment. Even in my life`s choices if I
chose to do something it is because it is authorized by religion.
It’s as important as the air I breathe. It gave me values. My speech, respect,
non-judgment from others. I can't steal from someone. I was immersed in it
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since very young, I had the religious foundation from the beginning and I grew
up with it, which is not the case for most people. The concern is that as long as
we keep knocking on religion, as long we do not give people the means to
practice their religion properly, we will have this problem of nationalism
religion etc.
This is important, frankly without religion I would have made mistakes. This is
a course of action.
It is important. It helps you in faith, in respect.
It is important.
I don't practice too much but I know a lot, but I actually have trouble with
prayer. But I intend to be more involved later.
Participants highlighted how the concept of hybridity played a role in the
construction of their identity. They explained how they felt about their identity:
neither totally French nor totally their parents ethnic background but rather a mix of
both cultures. The transmission of their parents’ cultures is very much valued and
carried through the language, the food, the religion, and the affirmation of their
belonging to their parents’ culture. On the other hand, the transmission of the French
culture is very much acknowledged in their lives as well. This incompatibility that
some participants felt between their Muslim faith and French culture also translated
into the concept of laïcité and their identity. Participants must contend with being
Muslim in a secular state. Research question two explores the impact of secularism in
the construction of their Muslim identity.
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Research Question 2. What is the impact of laïcité in the construction of Muslim
youth identity?
Laïcité and being Muslim.
Laïcité is defined as secularism. Though the concept of secularism exists in
many societies the French have put an emphasis on secularism and laïcité is the
essence of the French nation. It is stated in the opening of the French constitution “La
France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale.”13 Laïcité also
marked the separation of Church and the State. Therefore, religion is supposed to be
absent from the public sphere and remain of the private domain.
Participants had to reflect on their faith and secularism in France and if both
could coexist with no issue. For Issouf and Kouassi the answer was emphatically yes.
They did not see an issue with being a practicing Muslim and secularism.
Well yes, because once again it's about adapting at school. For example, at
school when it was time for prayer, I did not go to pray. I was waiting to go
home to pray. Always the adaptation.
Very good question. I would say yes.
Issouf adapted his religious self to fit the parameters of secularism in public
spaces particularly at school. He would practice his religion at home. Reza, however,
was a bit more detailed with his answer. He thought that it was compatible to be a
Muslim in a secular country, but there were issues causing difficulty. According to
Reza, people had a skewed view of Islam and both the media and Muslims themselves
are to blame.

13

France is an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic.
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Of course. The problem is that people have hijacked Islam. People have
turned away from the vision of Islam; I know the Qur'an. I know the Hadith.
But when you say people, you're talking about Muslims, or you're talking
about the media?
So, I start with the media and then I will talk about the pseudo-Muslims. There
was a time when you were Muslim, you were just Muslim. We weren't trying to
find out where you came from, what group you were from. The term Islamist
was created when we added “-ist” at the end when he is a radical Muslim.
Why don't we say Jewist? We say radical Jew. So why add anything? It is
useless. So, he is a Muslim. He may be a moderate, he may be a practitioner,
he may be radical, but he is a Muslim. The media gave a bad image. The
majority of young people who felt neglected and all that found some freedom
in Islam. Except that they interpreted it in their own way. The concern today is
that Muslims have no institution in France. So, imams have no rights. I said
they have no right.
Well if we have the CRIF?14
No, we have nothing at all. We have the rectorate of Paris. However, he is a
doctor. He did not study religious studies. To be an imam there are 5
pillars/conditions. In France they don't have [those 5 pillars]. Hence, the fact
that when an imam gives an interpretation of the Quran, it is necessarily
wrong. Because he himself has no foundation. Example: If you tell a child who
does not know that 1 + 1 = 2 and you tell him about the Pythagorean

14

CRIF is the Conseil Représentif des Institutions juives de France [Representative Council of French
Jewish Institutions].

104

Theorem, what will he understand? Well, it’s exactly the same. We are in the
Buttes Chaumont sector. We all know the Buttes Chaumont sector. I grew up
here. The Buttes Chaumont sector I know it very well. The concern was that in
fact it was people who had learned three words in Arabic and who came to
give lessons to young people who were lost, who had lost their parents, who
had spent a little time in prison. And I'm not denigrating them. Far from it. It's
just that. They found the weaknesses they played with it. Because the term
Islam means peace. At the time of the prophet [said name in Arab] when he
was mayor of Medina, there were three large Jewish tribes [said name in
Arab]. You also had Christians. He created a multicultural law not to harm
anyone. And today we don’t apply his words. In fact, we interpreted it as we
wanted. I believe that any religion is good, but once man intervenes, it
becomes perverted, because we tend to try to legalize what we want and
prohibit what we don’t want. We are human beings, and it is normal to
interpret, but you do not have enough science to interpret things your way.
Yes
Other participants, on the other hand, felt that secularism and Islam were not
compatible.
No.
Why?
For example, the veil is prohibited at school. Why? Let them explain why
when they can find a real explanation for the fact that the veil is prohibited at
school, but I don't see a rational explanation to explain why the veil is
prohibited. It’s really targeting (us). They really target the Muslim community
by saying that the veil is prohibited, because they know there is a certain
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identity to wearing the veil. We know when we see a woman with the veil, she
is Muslim. So, secularism is not compatible with my beliefs, at least my
convictions. It’s about making laws to make us forget religion. It is really to
hide all that and make us live in a world of teddy bears. We are believers so
we must not live in a world of teddy bears. One should always be aware that
one day the punishments will happen. Personally, compromising my religion is
not my thing.
It is not compatible but after all we do not have a choice. It's either that—show
you’re a Muslim—or you're not going to school. If you are a girl, it is harder
for those who wear the veil. She must remove it in front of the entrance. It's
hard.
So, when you go to school you see girls removing the veil?
All the time, yes! Since I am in college, they remove the veil.
Yes, because religion is practiced at home, the prayer. We don't have to show
it.
You are a boy. But what if you were a girl?
Yes, there is a clash. It is not compatible. In this instance, it is not compatible.
Have you known any girls who had to reveal themselves before going to
school?
Yes. We could not wear caps or a veil.
Assane agreed with Amadou and made a specific distinction when it came to
religion and gender. They both pointed out that being a Muslim girl who wears the
hijab made secularism and Islam even more incompatible.
As part of secularism and enforcing it in public schools the discussion about
getting rid of substitute meals was a hot topic. Participants were asked their thoughts
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about that initiative. Issouf, Ousmane, Amadou, Boubacar, and Assane all expressed
their discontentment with the initiative:
It's disgusting. After yes for the Jews. Now they want to do this for us Muslims
knowing that we are a big part in France. They really want to break people.
It’s shocking why stop a person from following a certain diet. What do they
want? I don’t see what is disturbing about a person who doesn’t eat meat,
doesn’t eat pork, doesn’t drink alcohol. It is to force everyone to follow one
path. For them there is only one way, one truth. Whereas normally France is
supposed to be about diversity.
It's not nice. They want to have a conflict. It hurts no one to give a meal to a
Muslim who does not eat pork. And it's stupid to want to get rid of that.
I think it’s wrong, because most people who don't eat pork will have to eat at
home.
It is unfair.
Participants were aware of the meaning of secularism and how it related to
religion. Some participants felt the need to adapt and keep religion to the private
sphere. Other participants such as Reza blamed the media for the misrepresentation of
Islam and the spread of negative views about Islam, thus influencing the public
perception.
After the terrorists attacks the lives of Muslim across the nation were impacted
directly or indirectly. Research question 3 looked at how it impacted their lived
experiences.
Research Question 3. How did the terrorist attacks impact Muslims’ lived
experiences?
Discrimination and stereotype of the Muslim community post Charlie Hebdo
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While anti-Islamic sentiments have always existed, they were crystallized by
the 2015 attacks. Public disdain became more widespread, obvious and vehement. In
the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks of January 2015, Manuel Valls,
member of the Socialist Party in France and Prime Minister of France at that time,
surprisingly declared in June 2015 during an interview, “We cannot lose this war
because it is a war of civilizations. It is our society, our civilization and our values
that we are defending” (Associated French Press, 2015). This declaration by the Prime
Minister, who is a member of the Socialist Party, was rather surprising as it was the
same concept used by the ex-Republican French president Nicolas Sarkozy, whose
values are in total opposition with those of the Socialist Party. However, Manuel
Valls’s sentiments were reflected in an uptick of the unfavorable views of Muslims
within the French population and across some European countries. In fact, the Pew
Research Center in the United States revealed that unfavorable views of Muslims
were on the rise in Europe. Participants were asked if they experienced any
difficulties related to their background since the attack. Some participants such as
Issouf, Kouassi and Reza felt the impact of those negative views of Muslims:
At first, yes, but after what I liked is that the French people, the others they
began to read, they began to understand what really Islam is. Since then no.
People know very well that there are good Muslims like bad Muslims. People
make the difference. After that depends on the neighborhood. For example,
here (in the 19th arrondissement) they have no choice. But for example, if you
go to a city where there are only racists and you come as a Muslim, they will
automatically think about the attacks. They're going to tell him he's a shady
guy.
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There was too much fuss about Islam. Today you know very well if someone
talks a little bit bad about Islam, they will be in every newspaper. We see it.
It's like that. Even politics, to have a political career they must badmouth
Islam a little bit. You have to say Islam is not good. It's barbarism; they do the
prayer too much; they do this “blah blah.” They do not integrate. If to be
integrated means to necessarily look like that person, I do not want that.
So yes yes, absolutely! So, on the one hand, the people who attacked Charlie
Hebdo were friends of mine. Ten days before I was with Chérif. You should
know that in the 19th the majority had unwanted S files, because we rubbed
shoulders with such and such. The concern that occurred with Chérif; I knew
him very well, we discussed; he had his opinions, and it was not in favor of
France. He believed that the United States greatly oppressed Muslims. After
what he did, we were all shocked. If he really did it. But I am not going to go
into conspiracy theory. It was shocking and I do not endorse it.
On the other hand, other participants did not directly experience the effects of
the terrorist attacks on their lived experiences. Ousmane even felt that it brought
people to Islam to try and understand Muslims. Amadou and Assane, though, did
recognize that they saw on social media a wave of hatred against Muslims making
overt threats:
No, now we can see that after the attacks more and more people are interested
in religion and come to our religion. This is what we realize after the trials we
went through. It can be positive. It is something that happens even if the
attacks were sad, to see people die. Even the day after the attacks as Muslims I
said to myself it's bad. Innocent people are dead, children under the guise of
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religion, because it has nothing to do with it (our religion). It is just killing
people, it's barbaric.
I was back home (in Senegal) in a French school, so we had a minute of
silence like everyone, but we felt via the (social) networks that it was already
hard for Muslims. So luckily, I was not there.
Not too much but Muslims in France I have seen this on social networks
telling them to be ready to go. I saw a lot of insults.
Then, Kouassi, Issouf, and Reza reflected on their personal experience and the
treatment they personally received in the aftermath of the attacks based on their
culture or religion. They were asked if they felt excluded based on their culture or
religion.
We feel a big difference toward us. We feel the difference, even distrust. There
is one point I would like to raise. French people who are white, I do not know
if we can call them of pure origins, they think; and it is an idea which is
beginning to get rooted in their head, they think we are replacing them. It's
something new that has also appeared in the French world. For them we are
replacing them. For them we are too numerous. But it's been 20 years they say
Muslims are 5 million in France. It has not changed so our parents did not
have children (as many we have been told). In fact, it suits them well in the
media. It is to make people who live in Brittany believe, to make them believe
the Muslims are only 5 or 6 million15. Five or 6 million: It is perhaps the
number of Muslims in Île de France we do not know all over France you have
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According to the Pew Research Center there were 5,7 million Muslims in France in 2017.
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to go to Marseille, you have to go to Montpellier, you have to go to Lille,
Bordeaux Toulouse. We are very, very numerous here.
Not excluded, but a lot of jokes about my last name because one of the guys
had the same last name as me. So sometimes people joke a little bit about it.
Even at times for interviews I have not been hired in relation to this stigma.
You go on YouTube or Facebook, just type [my surname], you see terrorism.
But it’s not all there is about [name associated with terrorism], there is
everyone else; [other famous people have that name]. There are football
players. There are presidents. Well, for example, I go to a meeting, I write [my
last name], well everyone looks at me while it has nothing to do with it [the
terrorist]. After that, it is bad memories. After tomorrow, even if I hear
someone who goes to the dentist and says Mr Lepen,16we are going to turn
around, we are going to look, we are going to say he's a racist. It goes both
ways.
I got arrested because I was running17. No seriously! I was a taxi driver at the
time. I was leaving to turn on my parking meter. They arrested me and
handcuffed me on the ground. I was running and I told them to wait until I
turn on my parking meter; after that you can do whatever you want. I can't
work if I don't turn on my parking meter on time. I couldn't turn it on. It was in
front of everyone and just being on the ground and people looking at you even
though you did nothing wrong, even if you were released. First, it's

Mr Lepen was the leader of a far-right party in France called “Le Front National”. He is well known
for his nationalistic views and negationist views about the Shoah.
16
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This anecdote eerily reminds us of Ahmaud Arbery who was killed while running black.
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humiliating. Secondly, even if you are released, people wonder "Yeah, but he
did something." There is a little doubt.
On the other hand, Ousmane, Amadou and Assane expressed that they did not
personally feel excluded in the aftermath of the attacks but knew of others who did
feel excluded:
Not especially. I really didn't have the problem of being excluded.
Personally, no, but I know that some Muslims feel excluded. For example, my
sister has trouble finding work as she wears the veil, while she has a
bachelor’s in commerce, she cannot find work because she has the veil.
No, it's just that I hear a lot of stereotypes about Muslims. For example, he
will go to Syria. For example, if we want to get married. We meet the motherin-law and the family, and she talks about those stereotypes. Non-Muslims are
suspicious. The Muslim person? They live in society they are open. There is
media misinformation about what a Muslim is. Why? They don't like the ideas
that are in the Quran. I say the Quran is the truth and they don't like the truth;
they want to lead people astray.
Lastly, participants gave their thoughts on the terrorists. Some participants
personally knew them. They lived in the same neighborhood, played video games
together, and attended the same mosque. They reflected on the motives of the
terrorists and this is what they had to say:
Frankly in hindsight I told myself they should have done otherwise. It is true
for us in Islam we must not speak ill of the prophet, we must not make a
caricature of the prophet. But they should have done otherwise. In my opinion
it's someone who put this idea in their head, and they made a mistake.
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We must respect each religion. People here would not accept if it was a
caricature of Jesus. We put him [Jesus] like that in a nightclub. They would
not accept that. So, we also do not accept that. However, it’s not that I defend
those who did that. For me, they did not have to do this. But it is them, Charlie
Hebdo, who is provoking, Charlie Hebdo. People will say they (Charlie
Hebdo) criticized all the other religions, but we see it only when they talk
about the Muslim religion. However, they go harder (on us) than on the
others. We see it. We feel it. We are already stigmatized if it is to add to it and
treat us less than.
We can understand but that doesn’t mean we’re going to excuse it. You can
see the reason why they did it. It’s true that making caricatures hurt some
people. Everyone has their sensitivity. Even me seeing the caricatures of
Jesus, Mohamed, to see this is not pleasant, but I’m not going to kill people for
that either. We will say there is tolerance and tolerance. These people did not
accept it, so they have attacked. It’s sad to have killed people, innocent
people. But I can understand why they did it. For them these things hurt them,
but I’m not going to excuse them and say “Yes, it’s good they’ve killed
people.”
I found out two days later. It was a friend of mine who called me and told me
it was a guy from the 19th district. I looked it up. I saw Chérif. I was shocked.
Chérif was someone who was rowdy, but his big brother was adorable. So,
after that, I did not endorse it. I'm not Charlie Hebdo. I say it clearly.
However, I am the police officer who died in the line of duty. I am the person
who suffered, but I am not Charlie Hebdo. However, it is a right, a
constitutional right. I have the right not to be so-and-so. I have the right not to
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endorse something. I do not endorse what they did. I talk about Chérif and the
bombings, and I do not endorse what Charlie Hebdo did either I believe it is a
call to hatred. OK, you did it [Charlie Hebdo caricature]; move on to
something else! Stop targeting the same thing, because the issue is that there
are people who are weak-minded, and in the end the blame is on us, those who
are “integrated”. The term integration: I hate it, but oh well. So, it's an
amalgam? That's it.
I understood because of the cartoons. They made a caricature of the prophet.
They did not like that so...
First, to me this story, I'm not too sure if it's true or if it's false. There are
rumors that say it's true, others say it's false. It's a cover up by the state. After
I understood why they did that, because they spoke badly of the religion. They
did not like the chronicles on the religion.
Amadou and Boubacar on the other hand did express that they did not
understand the motives of the terrorists and were quite shocked:
I was shocked. For me, the terrorists are not Muslims because the Muslim
religion is about love, peace, and they do the opposite of religion. It is they
who give a bad image of our religion because the Muslim religion is a religion
of peace and love. They kill in the name of Allah, and it is not our religion.
I did not understand.
In the aftermath of Charlie Hebdo some participants stated they did feel the
discrimination while other participants did not feel the change of treatment. While hey
unanimously condemned the terrorist attacks, they stated they could understand why
they occurred. They mentioned the continued relentlessness of Charlie Hebdo and the
targeting of the Muslim community.
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The responses of the participants were quite enlightening with respect to their
views on the terrorist attacks. Many Muslims across the nations echoed their
sentiments. Children at school refused to participate in the minute of silence and
defiantly proclaimed “I am not Charlie”. Those different incidents in the schools were
viewed by the government as incivilities and contrary to the values of the French
Republic.
Research question 4 focused on the national debate and subsequent
educational policies that emerged from that debate to address the response to the
terrorist attacks.

115

CHAPTER IV-B
FINDINGS

In this chapter documents were analyzed. Since it was not possible to conduct
interviews in the classroom, I decided to analyze official documents from the French
government as well as resources they made available to teachers to teach the events.
Unlike Chapter IV-A, this chapter addresses the educational policies, while interviews
are included, they are not the main focus. I had intended to observe a classroom and
teachers’ practices, however I could not obtain permission to conduct the study in the
school settings. Therefore, I shifted my focus to document analysis to get a broader
view of how the Educational system responded to the terrorist attacks educationally.
The documents were specifically designed in the aftermath of the attacks to help
educators in the classroom.
Research question 4. How do the terrorist attacks impact educational policies?
The terrorist attacks were a cataclysmic event in French society. People
scrambled to understand how and why it happened. Support from the entire world
poured in. World leaders marched hand in hand together in Paris to commemorate the
victims. More than 3 million people marched in the Parisian streets (Le Parisien,
2015). Two weeks after the attacks, the French Minister of Education, Najat VallaudBelkacem, unveiled a series of measures to help restore teachers’ authority in the
classroom and to ensure that Republican values were transmitted. This wave of
measures came after several reports that students were not respecting the minute of
silence. Vallaud-Belkacem stated,
When these young people feel frustrated with school, they look for an identity
elsewhere and put forward their religious identity, ... It is not surprising that they are
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impervious to republican values. It is not just family that must transmit values, but
school also” (Alami, 2015, paras.2).
Echoing the Education Minister Ousmane stated:
The person I am today is because of my parents who gave me these values, this
education, this respect for people. It’s not the French system at all. We can see
today that the French have an education. You will not tell me that they are
better educated than us. I find that we even have better principles than them.
We can also see it with the babysitters of white children who are often black
moms. And why? Because they know that at the educational level, they
regulate children well. They teach them the values. we see that the children
educated in this way are much better than those who are educated supposedly
with the national education. At the educational level they really train nobody.
Parents are the primary educators who transmit the values. Education Minister
Najat Vallaud-Belkacem wanted to change that and put school at the forefront of the
transmission of the Republican values. To achieve this goal the Ministry of Education
unveiled a €250 million plan to train French teachers to discuss issues of racism and
reinforce the notion of “le vivre ensemble” [live together] (Alami, 2015). The plan
also included the implementation of the enseignement moral et civique (EMC) (moral
and civic education). EMC would be taught from kindergarten to 12th grade through
educational tools provided by the Ministry of Education. It also included the singing
of the national anthem “La Marseillaise” (De la Baume, 2015). The official website
for the Ministry of Education, Eduscol, provides official bulletins, reports on EMC
but also information about laïcité at school and radicalization prevention.
Interestingly, the Ministry of Education must draw attention on the fact that
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radicalization is not just regarding Islam. In the figure below the arrow points at the
sentence “Radicalization is not exclusive to Islamist terrorism”.
Figure 3
Prevention against Radicalization at School

Participants expressed feeling targeted for their religion and being regarded
and treated as potential terrorists, while the Ministry of Education wants to reinforce
that Islam is not targeted when it comes to preventing radicalization, but rather
attention is paid to all religious extremism.
EMC
The Ministry of Education published an official bulletin highlighting the
different components of the EMC. It focuses on three goals:
1) Respect others
2) Acquire and share the values of the Republic, and
3) Build a culture of civism.
The first goal—Respect others—aims to teach students to value other human beings
and respect their freedom and treat them as equal and to develop relations of fraternity
echoing the French national motto “liberty, equality, fraternity”. It also mentions that
it includes the respect of their philosophical and religious views, which fosters
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secularism (Ministry of Education, 2018). The second goal—Acquire and share the
values of the Republic—focuses on the transmission of the Republican values. It is
necessary to transmit those values to guarantee the freedom of its citizens and “in
addition to the transmission of knowledge, the Nation sets the school's primary
mission to share the values of the Republic with students. Public education service
helps all students acquire respect for the equal dignity of human beings, freedom of
conscience and secularism” (Ministry of Education, 2018). Lastly, the third goal—
Build a culture of civism—emphasizes that while citizens enjoy a certain freedom,
they are still part of a community with common values and laws that they must
respect. Of those common values, secularism is one of them.
Laïcité
Laïcité, or secularism, is a core aspect of the French Republique in Article 1
of the French constitution it is said that France is an indivisible country, secular,
democratic and social. Laïcité is a concept that is taught at school in civic education.
The law of 1905 established total French laïcité. Still, French secularism particularly
in education is viewed as incompatible with Muslim students’ faith. Later, this
incompatibility translates into a ban on any religious sign specifically targeting the
headscarves worn by Muslim female students. If they refused to remove their
headscarves, they were denied entry to school further marginalizing them.
The participants in this study expressed their views on the principle of laïcité
taught at school. Participants were asked what they were taught about secularism at
school. The answers below reflect their definition of secularism according to what
they were taught: Amadou, Boubacar, Assane and Issouf defined laïcité in terms of
either respect for religions or the non-showing of religious signs:
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It's to be good to others, no? Do not show your cross at school, and things that
show you are part of a religion.
Respect for several religions.
Secularism is when we are told we are in a secular school we are in neutral
territory. We do not display religions.
According to them we are all the same, must not show one’s origins, not show
one’s religion. Liberty equality fraternity. I do not even believe it.
Kouassi, Ousmane and Reza on the other hand did not see secularism as
simply respect for religions or not showing their faith:
For me if I understand secularism is the weapon that we use against Muslims
to say to Muslims "oh no do not show yourselves too much, “le vivre
ensemble” [live together]. But it does not bother anyone when someone wears
a cross around the neck. So why does it bother when someone wears a
djellaba, or when someone puts on a veil. I don’t get it. I see this through
discrimination. In the sense they always want to remind us “Oh yeah! You're
Muslim, so you're different.”
We are told that secularism was not showing any ostentatious sign. This is the
version of what we hear secularism is. There must be no religious signs in
public space. They are trying to take away our religion. For me it is!
Supposedly for them, it's for people to accept. each other. But in fact, no, it's
just that presidents decided to be atheists, and everyone has to bow to their
choice. I want to live my faith as I want. If they, for example, don't want to
show any ostentatious sign outside, that's their problem. But I don't see how if
I see someone with a cross outside or even in class, I don't see how that affects
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me. Secularism for me is vague, it's a ploy they use when they want to create a
controversy.
The right to worship as long as you don't go against the laws of the republic.
Except that today it means that you have no right to worship, which is a bit
odd because really secularism is perfect. You practice your faith as you see fit
as long as you don't bother others. Apart from secularism we talk about
behavior. You can have any behavior you want at home, but outside with the
neighbors you're not going to piss off the world {with your behavior}. I
consider it a “savoir vivre”, if we really knew what it meant if we hadn't
distorted its meaning. After the media really hijacked its meaning. I believe
that the conflict we have today really started in the 95s.
With the law about the veil, you think?
My sisters went to school with the veil; it never bothered anyone. My sister
passed her baccalaureate at 14. Her teachers loved her. There was never a
problem. Except that French people are stupid. When [French people] are
told that the veil disturbs, well then, the veil now disturbs.
These participants saw secularism as a ploy, even a weapon used against Muslims.
Even though secularism had existed in the French constitution for decades, it was not
until two decades ago with the controversy about the veil that secularism in the public
space and more specifically the school sites became an ongoing debate. They felt that
their rights to worship were respected as long as it did not infringe on French laws.
They particularly do not understand how an ostentatious religious sign goes against
secularism. To help teachers and students alike, the Ministry of Education created
resources to implement laïcité in schools. A charter was created in different formats
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so teachers could use it in their classrooms, or the school could put in the bulletin
board outside of the school visible by all. This charter contains 15 points explaining
the principles of laïcité in the Republican schools. The charter states, “The Nation
entrusts the School with the mission of sharing to the students the values of the
Republic”.
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Figure 4
Secularism Charter at School
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The first point states “France is an indivisible Republic, secular, democratic
and social. It ensures equality before the law, throughout its territory, by all the
citizens. She respects all beliefs”. The Charter emphasizes that while France is a
secular Republic it respects all beliefs. Therefore, the Republican school is also a
place where all beliefs should be respected. In point 3, the charter further states that
“Secularism guarantees freedom of conscience to all. Everyone is free to believe or
not to believe. It [Laïcité] allows the free expression of one’s convictions, with
respect for those of others and within the limits of public order”. Therefore, freedom
of religion is respected as well as the freedom to express one’s religion and is a right
that French citizens enjoy. Some participants expressed that they could indeed freely
express their religious beliefs as long as it was within the limits of public order. Other
participants, on the other hand, pointed out that they did not feel that religious beliefs
were respected and that they could not freely express their faith without fear of being
stigmatized.
Lastly, in point 10 the charter states, “It is the responsibility of the staff to
convey to students the meaning and value of secularism, as well as other
principles and fundamentals of the Republic. They [educators and school staff]
ensure their application in the school context. It is their responsibility to carry this
charter to the knowledge of the parents of students”. School officials such as teachers,
the administration and staff are public servants and as such it is their responsibility to
transmit the Republican value of secularism and that they are to ensure those values
are respected in the Republican School. Teachers are given resources to teach
secularism at school. Let us look at some of those resources.
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Web Resources
Réseau Canopé
The website offers educational resources for the schools. It published
a video “Vinz et Lou - Secularism and religious facts” about laïcité for students ages
7 to 12 years. In this video students learn the distinction between “knowing” and
“believing”. Teachers are given the keys to share knowledge about secularism and
religious facts while transmitting elements of culture essential to the understanding of
the contemporary world, to speak about it in a peaceful way, and to calm the
controversies and tensions raised by the project” (Réseau Canopé, 2017).
Figure 5
Vinz et Lou - Secularism and religious facts
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Enquête
Enquête is described as follows on their website “an association approved by
the Ministry of National Education and laureate of “France is committed”. Enquête
designs pedagogies and playful educational tools in secularism and religious facts to
develop in children a calm and thoughtful relationship to these subjects” (Enquête,
2019). On this website, the organization Enquête proposes different resources such
as activities teachers can use in their classrooms to teach about secularism “in those
troubled times” (Tanisme Pen Point, 2020). One of those activities is True/False. The
facilitator will organize a True/False on secularism around the following concepts:
freedom, equality, separation and neutrality, school, pluralism. The facilitator uses
the “True-False Quiz: secularism in concrete terms is what?”. Teams compete
against each other by answering questions about secularism. Enquête describes the
rules as follows: To play True-False, form three teams. Ask a team a question: if they
find the answer, it gains one point, if it is able in addition to justify it, it gains two
points. If she does not find the answer, other groups have the right to respond. You
can also animate this activity with a river of doubt if you have space. Summarize
with the children the essential principles of secularism. If necessary, have a hanged
man about expressions "freedom of conscience" and "freedom of worship". Ask
them what these expressions concretely involve: showing that there are very different
beliefs depending on the person. Help them find the words learned: there are people
who have a religion, monotheistic or polytheistic, there are atheist people and
agnostic people (p. 11)
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Bibliothèque Nationale de France
The Bibliothèque Nationale de France (BNF) or the National Library of
France proposes a virtual exhibition. This file also includes problematized educational
avenues and resources.
In the section titled “To kill in the name of God,” BNF tackles the topic of
killing in God’s name. In the figure below the slides discuss religious wars. The
picture of a visually Arabic child dressed in a military suit was chosen to evoke
possible modern religious wars. One can wonder the intent behind choosing such a
specific picture, especially knowing it is a resource used in schools. The question
“would Muslim children feel even more targeted and stigmatized?” could be raised.
Figure 6
To Kill in the name of God.
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Bibliothèques sans Frontières
Bibliothèques sans Frontières [Libraries Without Borders] proposes a web
series directly following the attack of Charlie Hebdo. On its website it states “These
short videos echo a strong demand from parents, teachers and students after the
attacks against Charlie Hebdo and its journalists in January 2015. Somewhat helpless
in the face of questions to which they had no answers, many teachers have turned to
Libraries Without Borders, asking for educational support. Responding to this call,
with the support of the January 11 Fund, Bibliothèques sans Frontières is now
offering a web-series of 10 videos on secularism explained by law, intended for
children and young people, but also for adults, whether they are teachers, parents, or
quite simply citizens'' (Bibliothèques sans Frontières, 2017). In one of their videos
titled “Why condemn Dieudonné and not Charlie Hebdo,'' they address the question of
the double standard, an issue also raised by the participants. Dieudonné is a famous
French humorist. He has publicly spoken about the Jewish community and was
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legally condemned for his comments. Libraries Without borders mentioned that
students have asked why he was condemned for his comments about the Jewish
community and not Charlie Hebdo for their comments about Islam.
Generation laïcité
Generation laïcité is a joint initiative of the National Consultative
Commission on Human Rights (CNCDH) and the Observatory of secularism, to help
young people discover what secularism is. Through a question-answer game, students
can discover secularism daily. It is interesting to note that out of 30 questions, 7
questions or scenarios concern Islam, 2 are in regard to Judaism, and one in regard to
Catholicism. The rest are generic questions about religion in general.
Summary
In this chapter, several themes that emerged throughout the study were
explored. The themes of hybridity and identity, laïcité, othering, language, and
parental influence on identity formation as well as the Muslim faith and
discrimination were discussed. The views of participants on their identity were
presented to support the themes that emerged. An analysis of official written
documents was also provided to present the impact of the attacks on educational
policies at the national level.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE
Summary of the Purpose Study and Research Questions
The purpose of this case study was to investigate the negotiation of Muslim
youth identity in a post-Charlie Hebdo France. The study was particularly warranted
with respect to understanding attitudes of young Muslims living in an area of Paris
known to harbor homegrown terrorists. This qualitative study also examined the effect
of the attacks on educational policies. To understand these phenomena, I examined
how Muslim youth in the 19th arrondissement constructed their cultural identity. I
also investigated how the terrorist attacks of January 2015 impacted their lived
experiences. Additionally, educational policies and materials directly implemented in
the aftermath of the attacks were examined to gain a deeper understanding of the
measures taken by the government as a direct response to those attacks at the
educational level.
A qualitative case study, which “means to study research problems inquiring
into the meanings individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem” was
used (Creswell, 2007, p. 37). It allowed me a platform for offering participants a voice
often unheard in the actual context. As a matter of fact, the situation in France
regarding the events remains highly volatile. In the wake of the attacks of Charlie
Hebdo and later that year of the November attacks that left 130 dead (Walt, 2020), as
well as the Nice attacks of 2016 (Salaün & Pailliez, 2020) and most recently the
beheading the history teacher (Walt, 2020), Muslims are still under a microscope.
Participants face the challenges of being Muslim in the aftermath of the terrorist
attacks.
The research questions were the following:
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1. How do Muslim youth construct their cultural identity?
2. What is the impact of laïcité in the construction of Muslim youth identity?
3. How did the terrorist attacks impact Muslims’ lived experiences?
4. How do the terrorist attacks impact educational policies?
Context of Findings
This study serves to add literature onto an ongoing phenomenon: terrorist
attacks by Muslim youth in France. As terrorist attacks continue to occur—the latest
attack occurring on October 16, 2020—it is crucial to hear the voices of Muslim
youth to find policies that may effectively bridge the divide between Muslim youth
and the French Republican School. This study highlights eight participants' voices on
their cultural identity, laïcité, and their views on the terrorist attacks of January 2015.
Following is a discussion and implications of the findings
Discussion, Implications of Findings
Research Question 1: How do Muslim youth construct their cultural identity?
Hybridity: What am I?
Galeotti (1993) wrote that the educational system is “an instrument of the
secular state for the public education of the future citizens, where all religious
symbols are banned and public spirit should be taught…The public school is then
meant to produce French citizens and not the citizens of a multiethnic polity”
(Galeotti, 1993, p. 592). Similarly, Bleich (2000) wrote that the French Republican
School has promoted French universalism at school since its inception. As a matter of
fact, to guarantee the integration of all its citizens, France requires its citizens and
immigrants to “completely assimilate into the French society in order to become
French. National identity prevails over group or religious identity” (Scott, 2007,
p. 13). While the French Republican School is promoting French universalism and a

131

common French identity, in their study Croucher et al. (2008) found that “FrenchMuslims reported significantly higher levels of ethnic identification than nonMuslims” (p. 191). The present study shows that participants find themselves at a
crossroad regarding their identity. They must navigate between their ethnic identity,
religious identity, and French identity.
Ethnic Identity, Language and Culture
Findings reveal that the participants perceived their identity as a mix of French
culture and the culture of their parents. At home they were raised traditionally
following the cultural customs of their parents, such as food choices, religion and
language. Kouassi stated that he did not eat pork or drink wine because of his African
culture (which would equate with his Muslim religion). Issouf and Assane
emphasized speaking their parents’ language Malian and Senegalese at home or with
their peers who also speak the language “to tease each other”. Croucher et al (2008)
noted “our ethnic identities define who we are; these identities offer commonality in
linguistic and nonverbal behavior” (p. 184). They found commonalities in speaking
the language with their peers even if they all speak French. Code switching a big part
of their language identities. Participants also pointed out the cultural aspect of their
upbringing. Assane explained that he had the culture from Senegal, and he knew a lot
of stories from Senegal. Ousmane also pointed out that his parents transmitted their
culture to him through education, he also spoke about the stories he heard about Mali.
His parents told him stories that he could relate to unlike the stories told about
Clovis18 at school. Embracing their parents’ ethnic culture is a way to assert
themselves and their heritage in the French society, to showcase the diverse country

18

First king of the Franks
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that France is. Reza as a matter of fact expressed that this diversity made “France one
of the most beautiful countries”. It is also a way to honor their parents. They are who
they are because of how their parents raised them, the values they instilled in them.
Ousmane noted “I would never deny everything my parents taught me. Because the
person I am today is because of my parents who gave me these values, this education,
this respect for people. It’s not the French system”. To not acknowledge and embrace
their ethnic identity would be like disowning their parents and their values as Kouassi
explained “To be honest I accept some aspects of the French identity, but I do not
accept it 100% because if I accepted it 100% it means to deny our other origin and
that's what they want some of them. That's what they would like me to do I cannot
deny the origin of my parents”. When asked how they would describe themselves to
members of their own community Kouassi answered “I am proud of who I am. I feel
like a black Muslim”. While participants spoke highly of their parents’ cultural
background and influences in their lives, they mentioned the influence of the French
culture in their lives as well.
French Identity, Language and Culture
Participants also recognized the influence of the French culture on their
upbringing. Participants were asked if they identified more as French or their parents
‘ethnicity. They almost unanimously responded that they identified more with the
French identity. Reza emphatically exclaimed “I am 2000% French!” The factors that
contributed to them identifying more with their French identity were school
education, language, location and citizenship. Location as in where they physically
lived and where they were born, was one of the first factors they mentioned. Amadou,
Assane and Kouassi stated “I live in France”. Where they lived but also the location
where they were born was an important factor for them, rooting their French identity
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in France. Issouf declared “Sometimes we are even more French than French who are
born in Spain or wherever, they say they are French but us we are born in France”.
Then, Reza commented “we have a European education”, thus citing education as
another factor of their identification with the French identity. The language was
another aspect. Issouf said “I can speak French with my sisters. I go out, I speak
French”. Citizenship is really what gives participants a certainty in their French
identity, that they too are French just the same as white French. Boubacar
acknowledged “I was born here. I have the French citizenship”. Amadou echoed
Boubacar’s statement “I’m French because I have my papers”. Their French
citizenship is documented.
There is always a strong need as well to have their Frenchness validated by
other French people. Participants mentioned that they were seen as French when there
was the World Cup of soccer. The French national soccer team had 17 non -white
players out of 23. Kouassi mockingly said
You can see me as French when you follow the world cup like Paul Pogba
Ngolo Kanté [ soccer players]. They don’t see you as French when you go to
prison or when you work at the post office. That is the problem, but in both
cases in the worst and in the best [scenario] they must see you as a
Frenchman”.
Ousmane echoed that sentiment stating:
The only day they tried to hug me was in the subway during the day of the
World Cup. At that moment we were all French. Ngolo Kante Ngolo Kante.
Everyone loved blacks, Arabs, everyone loved each other that day. Personally,
I feel like I am a foreigner because I work at the cash register in a rather
upscale district, you will say. I feel the gaze of customers on me. Some won’t
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even say hello. We can feel a certain disgust because yes, I have to give you
money [ to pay], but you remain black. Even if the person is going to speak to
you, they will use a vocabulary that they would not use with a white person.
Respect is not the same.
Ousmane was treated as a subaltern, as somebody who is less than by the
clients coming to store. He clearly felt the difference in the way of how they
addressed him, interacted with him, and ultimately respected him or lack thereof.
Other: a stranger in my homeland/contested identities
Apart from feeling that their identity is the result of mixing the French culture
and their parents’ culture, participants also expressed that, despite identifying with
French culture and being taught French culture, they feel as strangers in their
homeland as a result of otherization by other French people. Ousmane noted “there is
still a lot of stigmatization among the French who increasingly reject Islam”. Kouassi
recounted an experience he had
Last time there was a lady who asked me the question "what is your origin?" I
told her I was from, and I lied to her, I told her I am West Indian so she would
leave me alone. But she said to me “but sir where are you from?”. First, I said
French after she pushed me to say West Indian. Yet She repeated "what is
your origin?" Well now I will tell you the truth I am African, West African
Ivory Coast. But you understand the question (he speaks to me). On three
occasions she told me, sir, where are you from? For her there is French yes but
there is those of French descent. You have to justify yourself.
Otherization also occurred through the media and politics. The media
regularly discusses the Muslim community. Fredette (2014) found that between 1994
and 2008 there was an increase of mention of the word Muslim in the renown French
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newspaper Le Monde (p.37). It was directly related to current events. Though I do not
have current statistics on the mention of the word Muslim or Islam in France in the
media a quick search on google for articles about the French Muslim community or
Islam yields a great number of results with newspaper articles and videos. Kouassi
lamented “The problem is the media overwhelm us; they accuse us. Oh, there is a
problem with Muslims. Every day they say there is a problem with Muslims”.
Ousmane also stated “In France you can see through the media they are focusing a bit
on Islam”. Fredette (2014) also found that “Unfortunately for Muslims, “becoming
news” has meant “becoming a problem.” In each of these events, Muslims are
associated with violence, extreme religiosity, and disrespect for France’s secularism”
(p. 39). The politicians and to a certain extent the French government regularly
discuss Muslims as well. Indeed, it has become a political platform for some like
Marine Le Pen who is the leader of the far right but more surprisingly or maybe not
leaders from the right and sometimes the left joined the chorus about antiMuslimness. In the aftermath of the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks of January 2015,
Manuel Valls, member of the Socialist Party in France and Prime Minister of France
at that time, surprisingly declared in June 2015 during an interview, “we cannot lose
this war because it is a war of civilizations. It is our society, our civilization and our
values that we are defending” (Associated French Press, 2015). Nicolas Sarkozy in
2010 said during a speech “It must be admitted, and I must say it, we are suffering the
consequences of fifty years of insufficiently regulated immigration, which have
resulted in a failure of integration” (Mallié, 2010). During that same speech Sarkozy
explored the possibility of stripping away the citizenship of criminals of immigrant
descent. Politicians make very public comments on the failure of integration of
Muslims into the French society. Reza echoed that feeling stating, “it is clear that the
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French government has a real problem with foreigners or the children of foreigners
and it is they who create this discomfort through the media, through the laws which,
it's institutional racism”. One can wonder how do you fail to be integrated in a society
you were born into? Is their religiosity a marker of a failed integration?
Participants mentioned that the color of their skin was often a giveaway for
their non Frenchness, for them being seen as Other. This discrimination based on skin
color preclude them from attaining equal citizenship. Despite their verifiable
citizenship, their visible ethnic marker thrust them in an ambiguous relationship with
French society. They are only acknowledged as French when they positively
contribute to French society on the local, national, or international stage like during
the World Cup.
Noteworthy is the concept of color blindness the French Republic is trying to
convey through its principle of universalism and Frenchness. No matter the color,
origin, religion the French people are one and the same (Scott, 2007, p. 11). However,
Fredette (2014) remarked: “young Muslims, are less trustful of the French republican
ideal of laïcité, at least as it is articulated by most French elites. They do not have the
same degree of faith in the difference-blind model that the cohort (using the phrase
loosely) ahead of them does” (p. 53). This concept of color blindness does not
translate into the inevitable question that occurs after stating being French “But where
are you from?” The answer of “I am French” is not satisfying enough. One participant
pointed out that even when at the police station, the police officers would make fun of
his answer by randomly shouting African countries in a mocking manner further
othering him. At every level they are othered. What was striking was the look of
resignation on their face “We are used to it”.
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Participants explained that they constantly had to remind other French people
of their own French identity and belonging to the French Republic. They insisted on
the fact that they were born in France and thus were French. Ousmane noted “I was
born here. I am French!” Amadou went further stating “I’m French because I have my
papers”. Their citizenship to them should outweigh their skin color in determining
their Frenchness.
Interestingly, participants noted that while the process of otherization occurred
in France, it also occurred in their parents’ native country. Reza plainly pointed out “I
am a foreigner here. I am a foreigner in Algeria”. Ousmane stated that “in Mali we are
not really Malian”. Ironically Kouassi described how paradoxically in Africa he was
called a white man. His Frenchness made him a white man in the eyes of the locals
despite his dark skin. Frenchness is rooted in whiteness.
Otherization done by other members of the French society, the media and
politics was not a surprising finding, however, self-otherization was a finding I did
not expect to find. I define self-otherization as the internalized “foreignness” ascribed
by others to the subjects. Participants were asked how they described themselves to
other French people (i.e., not issue from the diaspora, or of not known immigrant
heritage), what the media refer to as a Français pure souche. Ousmane replied “
Most of the time I will say directly that I am Malian. I mean of Malian origin.
Madame, if I said I have papers, you know I have French papers. If they see
me walking and they say to me "Where do you come from?" I'm not going to
tell them I'm from France. I'm going to tell them directly the origin because
that is what they are waiting for. They see my skin and they know.”
In research question 2 I discussed the impact of laïcité on the construction of
Muslim youth identity.
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Research Question 2. What is the impact of laïcité in the construction of Muslim
youth identity?
To be or not to be laïc
Secularism in France and especially in the public sphere is a major topic of
discussion. Participants were asked to reflect on their knowledge of the concept of
laïcité and what they were taught at school, as well as how this concept impacted their
religiosity. Findings reveal different perspectives on the subject matter. For some
participants they understand and agree with the concept of secularism and religiosity
being a private matter. They understand the separation of state and religion. They
would practice the prayer at home because school or work is a public space where
practicing one’s religion has no place. On the other hand, some participants felt that
being a practicing Muslim in a secular state was not compatible especially if wearing
visible religious signs such as the veil, expressing incomprehension as to why the veil
would be banned at school. While secularism was originally about the Catholic
Church some participants felt that now secularism is specifically targeting Islam.
Davis (2011) argued that secularism protected French citizens from the influence of
religious groups and most specifically the Catholic Church. However, the focus
shifted to Islam as France became home to the largest Muslim population in Western
Europe (p. 122-123). The ban of religious signs following the incident of 1989 was
the beginning of a dredge between Islam and the secular French State. Participants
were asked about their knowledge of the concept of laïcité they were taught at school.
They all perfectly understood what laïcité meant. Participants noted that you could
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not show any visible religious signs in the public sphere. Kouassi noted it was part of
“le vivre ensemble” 19 a notion taught at school.
Figure 7
The four pillars of “le vivre ensemble”

The four pillars are Individual encompassing identity, body and roles,
Classroom encompassing rules, differentiation, verbalization, Group encompassing
listening, relationship, empathy and benevolence and School encompassing inclusion,
integration, and citizenship. Participants understood laïcité to be the freedom to
practice any religion “as long as you don’t go against the laws of the Republic” stated

19

Live together.
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Reza, the respect of diversity and people accepting of each other. Viewed as such
laïcité seems to be an all-encompassing tenet, one that promotes the acceptance of
everyone. Conceptually laïcité could be regarded as acculturative in its tenets. When
one look at the definition of acculturation “a process through which a person or group
from one culture comes to adopt the practices and values of another culture, while still
retaining their own distinct culture” (Cole, 2019, para. 1), laïcité seems to lend itself
in that process. Laïcité is defined on the official French government website as
“Laïcité guarantees freedom of conscience. From this derives the freedom to express
one's beliefs or convictions within the limits of respect for public order. Secularism
implies the neutrality of the State and imposes the equality of all before the law
without distinction of religion or belief” (paras. 1). Therefore, in theory Muslims
should be free to exercise their religion free of pressure from others and particularly
from the State. However, the reality seems quite different according to participants.
Kouassi described laïcité “as weapon that we use against Muslims” to force them to
assimilate.
Frenchness/Assimilation
As mentioned previously, the concept of integration has been an integral part
of the public French discourse. The question was how can someone who was born in
France and raised in France need to be integrated into the French society? Aren’t they
intrinsically integrated, already a part of the community they were born and raised
into? If laïcité is carried out the way it is articulated, then Muslims would be an
integral part of the French society as they are without changing. However, it seems
that laïcité instead participates in the process of assimilation. Assimilation is defined
as “the process by which a person or group adopts a new culture that virtually
replaces their original culture, leaving only trace elements behind, at most” (Cole,
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2019, paras. 13). Cole (2019) further elaborates “Assimilation, as a process and an
outcome, is common among immigrant populations that seek to blend in with the
existing fabric of society” (paras. 2). France at its core promotes universalism, the
“oneness and sameness of all individuals…taken to be the antithesis of
communalism” (Scott, 2007, p. 11). Immigrants must completely assimilate into the
French society to be seen as French. Islam and practicing their religion seem to be in
direct opposition of Frenchness. This process of assimilation started during the
colonization era. During the occupation of Algeria, the French military adopted a
policy of forced assimilation where “the Algerian people were characterized as
‘Muslim French,’ Algerian towns were infused with French-style architecture, and
there was a high degree of linguistic acculturation” (Wiles, 2007, p. 704), including
“the removal of the veil…an essential step in the French nationalist agenda to make
Algeria French, for the veil was a visible barrier to the establishment of French
“indivisibility” (Bradford, 1999, p. 127). To this day we still have this neo
colonialism taking place through La Francophonie set up to spread and maintain the
French language worldwide through its ancient colonies. An expansion of colonialism
in which international activity provides exclusively for the benefit of France and not
necessarily those who come in contact with it.
Laïcité perpetuates the process of assimilation. Amadou explained “For
example when you go to work you will not show that you are Muslim you see. You
make abstraction of all that, you go about your day quietly and after you practice
(your religion). It does not help to show people that you are Muslim you will be
frowned upon. It's stupid”.
Some participants rejected this process of assimilation. When asked if to
achieve successful integration meant the loss or negation of their ethnic and religious
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identity would they want to be a part of that process, participants rejected that process
of assimilation. “Take away my French nationality and I keep Islam” said Issouf.
Ousmane stated “Religion is more important to me than my French identity”. Kouassi
flatly said “if to assimilate is to have a better job or to be seen like them […] so
assimilation does not interest me.” For participants, the parameters of laïcité as part of
the assimilation process and not the acculturative process as it is purported to be, is
forcing them to choose between participating in Frenchness by way of universalism or
to reject Frenchness to hold on to their ethnic and religious identity. Reza argued:
So, the term integration I don't accept it. I can't accept it. I know that I have a
French culture and that I was born in France. In fact, I am French by filiation.
My father is Algerian. In addition to that fact, that my mother is French by
blood. I don't see integration. For me it’s not about the person. As long as she
or he respects the laws of the republic, you can't talk to me about integration.
You went to school in France, you work in France, you have studied in France,
you have a French culture. For the most part when they go to their home
country, they are French. They have no culture [Arabic culture], they can't
speak Arabic, they can't write it, they can't read it. […] We are French because
we follow the laws of the republic, we respect the laws of the republic,
because we consider ourselves French.
For him, the term integration does not resonate because once again how can you ask
someone who was born, raised, educated in that country to assimilate into that
country? Participants live every day a conflict of battling biases, those of Frenchness
and laïcité. To this end, the children of immigrants then pay a price, not only in
France but in the country of their families.
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Research Question 3. How did the terrorist attacks impact Muslims’ lived
experiences?
Being Muslim in a post-Charlie Hebdo area
Participants had to reflect on their lived experiences in the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks. Findings again show differing experiences. Participants mentioned
the negative representation of Islam and Muslims that occurred in the aftermath of the
attacks. Demonizing Islam became a national sport which would land you on the news
further spreading harmful generalizations of Islam and Muslims. The media has
always fueled those harmful views of Muslims as Bowen (2007) noted “the French
news media did their best to inflame the resulting anxieties. By early 2002, many
French journalists, intellectuals, and officials increasingly linked the problem of
scarves in schools with three other problems of society: communalism, Islamism, and
sexism” (p.155). Participants did state that the media reinforced negative stereotypes
the general population may have had about Muslims. Charlie Hebdo crystallized even
more those anti-Muslims sentiments. Christophe Castaner the minister of the Interior
encouraged people to report individuals presenting signs of Islamist radicalization.
Those signs included: rigorous religious practice […] exacerbated during the
Ramadan”, “wear a beard”, “conversion ” to Islam,“ change of behavior in the
entourage ”, “whether he used to do the kiss and doesn’t do it anymore”, refusal to
work with a woman ”,“ regular or ostentatious practice of ritual prayer ”, or
even“ wearing the full veil ” for a female civil servant ” (Lyes, 2019, paras. 2). The
issue with those broad and loose signs of radicalization is how is the average citizen
able to make the difference between what constitutes normal religious practices and
true radicalization.
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This call to exercise your civic duty by denouncing suspicious behaviors also
led to an understanding of the motives of the terrorists by the participants. Not
surprisingly when participants were asked if they understood the motives of the
terrorists, they answered yes. Kouassi declared
We must respect each religion. People here would not accept if it was a
caricature of Jesus. We put him [Jesus] like that in a nightclub. They would
not accept that. So, we also do not accept that. However, it’s not that I defend
them those who did that. For me they did not have to do this. But it is them
Charlie Hebdo who is provoking, Charlie Hebdo. People will say they [Charlie
Hebdo] criticized all the other religions but we see it only when they talk
about the Muslim religion. However, they go harder [on us] than on the others.
We see it, we feel it. We are already stigmatized if it is to add to it and treat us
less than…
Other participants echoed Kaoussi’s point of view. Ousmane stated “We can
understand but that doesn't mean we're going to excuse it”. Reza’s views on the matter
were quite unique as he knew the terrorists. He explained
I found out two days later. It was a friend of mine who called me and told me
it was a guy from the 19th arrondissement. I looked it up. I saw Chérif. I was
shocked. Chérif it was someone who was rowdy, but his big brother was
adorable. So, after that I did not condone it. I'm not Charlie Hebdo, I say it
clearly. However, I am the police officer who died in the line of duty. I am the
people who suffered, but I am not Charlie Hebdo. Nevertheless, it is a right, a
constitutional right. I have the right not to be so-and-so. I have the right not to
condone something. I do not condone what they did I am talking about Chérif
and the bombings and I do not condone what Charlie Hebdo did either.
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While the participants understood the motives of the terrorists based on the
context of the caricature, they were not making an apology of terrorism. In fact, they
adamantly did not condone it. They expressed that while the terrorists disagreed with
Charlie Hebdo, they should have expressed their discontent without killing innocent
people. As mentioned previously laïcité seems to be promote assimilation rather than
acculturation.
Participants reflected on being Muslim in a post Charlie Hebdo secular France.
Laïcité became an even greater topic and focus of the Republican school. Educational
policies were put in place to ensure laïcité would be a notion well integrated and
upheld by French citizens.
Research Question 4. How do the terrorist attacks impact educational policies?
Discussion
To answer this question documents were analyzed. The government in the
aftermath of Charlie Hebdo published official documentation to not only help teachers
address the events but also to give them tools to promote laïcité, Frenchness, and the
values of the Republic. Those documents reinforced the process of assimilation.
While respect of diversity is mentioned several times, the notion of universalism is
also reinforced. The idea that students of immigrant descent need to integrate into the
society they were born into is at the forefront. Students are taught to recognize the
sign of radicalization and to denounce any suspicious behavior. The government
provides ample resources for all educational level to help teacher. The government
also provides external links of resources designed by other entities.
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Implications of Findings
This study explored how ethnicity, race, religion, citizenship, and culture
shaped the participants’ identities. These findings of this study shed light on laïcité
and how as a process of assimilation it fosters an environment in which participants
can understand the terrorists’ attacks. It also highlights the extent to which terrorist
cells and opportunities for radicalization exist in non-traditional communities. Studies
have found a correlation between perceived stigmatization and re- Islamization
(Hadad, 2007; Santelli, 2008). The negotiation of identity of the young Muslim
participants occurs through multiple factors such as education, language, location, and
citizenship creating multiple identities: a French identity, an Ethnic Identity, and a
Muslim identity. The negation of those multiple identities occurs in the “Third Space
of Enunciation” (Bhabba, 1994, p. 35). A hybrid identity encompassing all their
identity emerges. They are not just French, or Muslim or African, they all those
identities and proud of being who they are. However, laïcité only wants them to
embrace their French identity in order to be fully assimilated into the French society.
The rejection of who they are is well integrated into the public school and the
curriculum. The feeling of not being fully recognized in their integrity (with their
history, their religion, their double sense of belonging ...) is symptomatic of the
difficulty that French society has in recognizing its multicultural dimension (Santelli,
2008, p. 155)
As Kouassi noted “We went to school they taught us the story of Napoleon,
but we are black”. As a black woman who went through the school system, I was also
taught that my ancestors were the Gauls. The curriculum is not inclusive or reflective
of the diversity in the classroom. The French history curricula specifically includes
not only the story of colonizing, but also the stories of the colonized, especially those
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whose families end up in France. France briefly promoted differentialism (Bleich,
2000, p. 59). The right to be different and that difference being embraced. However,
France reverted to an assimilationist approach trying to erase differences while
promoting French universalism and a color-blind society to fight racism (Simon,
2006; Bleich, 2000). Low expectations of Muslims students are also an issue plaguing
the public school system (Bonet, 2011, p. 49). Ousmane felt strongly about low
expectation at school and had a lot to say about his schooling experience:
“The teachers are already going to put us in a category. In fact, even in middle
school, they have the opinion that as we are the children of foreigners, they are
not going to make us aspire to more. They will always hold us back and make
us feel that already if we get to bac + 2, doing a BTS is good. It’s like there’s a
“certain contentism”20 (be glad you made it this far). They will not try to push
us towards more and tell us “Yes you can try to study medicine etc.” when you
are young. Instead, they will say “it's good you know there are still vocational
high schools, or ways that will allow you to still have a good job and your
parents did not have your luck (opportunities). Instead of pushing us to do a
lot more than our parents, they will just try to tell us: hey, it's good, you're the
little stranger, you're the first generation, it's already good if you have a bac
+2. Leave the real jobs to the white people etc. those who come from families
who have more qualities etc. who will be able to push you to pursue long
studies like medicine, law etc.” We weren't really pushed to do that. We are
not aware of these things. We have not been informed of the various (job)
opportunities.

20

This is a term coined by the participant. The researcher kept that word as is to encapsulate the
participant’s strong opinion on the topic.
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I go to school [university] and we feel a disconnect in the school setting. I am
in a pretty famous school. There is a gap regarding access to schooling etc.
between minorities and the white majority.
The words of the participants appeared to be a predicted outcome when Bonet
stated (2011) “dominant and widespread anti-Arab and anti-Muslim sentiments,
fueled by the discriminatory practices of agencies representing the state, have
infiltrated the public school arena. These sentiments, which led to the disturbing
practices of discrimination detailed above, have been destructive to students’
educational aspirations, outcomes, psychosocial abilities, and sense of belonging”
(p. 51). Anti-Islamophobia Education, multicultural and antiracist pedagogy could be
effective tools to promote laïcité as an acculturative process and accept that there is
not one unique way to be French. Anti-Islamophobia education is a termed coined by
Jasmine Zine. “Anti-Islamophobia lends itself in a multicultural and anti-racist
framework” (Zine, 2012, p. 114). Anti-Islamophobia aims to develop critical
pedagogical tools that can be used to analyze and challenge systems of oppression and
domination for greater social justice. It also includes challenging harmful stereotypes
as “renewed Orientalist constructions of difference have permeated the representation
of Muslims in media and popular culture. Images of fanatical terrorists and burqa-clad
women are seen as the primary markers of the Muslim world” (p. 115). Zine proposes
an Anti-Islamophobia kit to accompany educators. The kit includes activities to help
all students understand how racism, classism, sexism, homophobia, ableism, and
faithism are factors leading to oppression. Activities also highlight the positive
contribution of Muslims to world culture and knowledge as well as a positive
Muslims figures to counter the negative images of Muslims (pp. 116-117).
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Multicultural education addresses discriminatory practices in education with
the purpose to promote social justice, equity, and high expectations for all students.
Multicultural education help students make connections, including their experiences
into the curriculum, but also highlighting their experiences as something to build
upon. Banks (1993) noted five dimensions of multicultural education:
(1) Content integration. Educators include examples, data, and information from
different cultures when teaching.
(2) The knowledge construction process. Educators guide students on the journey
to understand how race, ethnicity, social class influence the creation and
construction of knowledge.
(3) Prejudice reduction. Educators work with students to gain more democratic
racial attitudes.
(4) An equity pedagogy. Educators uses techniques and methods to promote the
academic achievement of all students regardless of their race, religion,
economic status.
(5) An empowering school culture and social structure. Restructuring the school
culture and organization of the school to help empower minorities and lowincome students. Educators’ expectations for achievement should be high for
all students. Labeling practices should be completed erased (p. 5).
Anti-racist pedagogy, views education as transformative. It focuses on social
justice and the dismantlement of structural racism and social inequality. Drawing from
Critical Race Theory, anti-racist pedagogy understands the social and historical
construct of racism which is embedded in the very fabric of our societies as well of
the institutionalization of racism. Anti-racist pedagogy rejects the dominant form of
knowledge and exclusionary educational practices. Anti-racist pedagogy aims to
produce a decolonized, anti-racist classroom where students’ experiences and
background are valued and an integral part of the classroom (Ono-George, 2019,
p. 503). This forces educators to confront, address and remedy their own internal
biases. This would permit students to express their plural identities. Frenchness would
be inclusive of the specificities brought on by children of immigrants.
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Researcher’s Reflection on the Study
I reflected on my relationship with participants as a researcher who is also part
of the minority herself. I also reflected on the assumptions I may have had while
doing this study and how it might interfere with my data analysis and reporting as
closely as possible the voice of the participants. Being the “instrument” of data
collection (Denzin & Lincoln, 2003), I kept a journal to record my assumptions,
possible bias, and observations. In France I was a non-Muslim Black woman
interviewing Muslim youth males. At first, I wondered if they would accept to
participate and genuinely answer my questions given the context. Some potential
participants once they understood the line of questioning refused to participate any
further. I also noticed that Muslim of Arabic origin were less open to participate once
they heard the questions about religion. I was even asked if I worked for the
government as an undercover agent. They were extremely distrustful of me in this
context of the dominant negative perception of their culture but mostly religion.
Besides most of them noted having a fiche S, therefore they were not particularly
eager to discuss religion. One of the possible participants jokingly said, “everything is
fine, everybody loves everybody, we want no trouble”. I introduced myself as being
also from the same arrondissement and to make a deeper connection I asked them if
they knew my cousin. Once they learned who my cousin was, they were more relaxed
and eager to speak with me. Also confirming their complete anonymity made things
easier. This is one of the reasons few information about the participants is given in the
study to protect their anonymity as stated earlier some have an active “fiche S”.
Several of the participants expressed that they hoped my study would help make their
voices heard. They liked the idea that someone from their same neighborhood was
listening to their stories and could relate to their stories as well, being that I am a
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French black woman from that same district. As a matter of fact, while telling me
their stories, there were several moments where I could relate and share my own
experiences with them, making me even more relatable and pushing them to further
open up and discuss the questions more in depth. My hope is that their voices are
heard not only in the United States but also in France, making seen and heard the
unheard.
Overall, the study generated a positive interest from the participants. While I
was interviewing some of the participants, they hailed other Muslim youth hanging
around to come and participate because “You have to help a sister out” as a
participant put it. Participants were even caring. Due to logistics I had to carry my
toddler in a baby carrier while interviewing participants. He fell asleep and while
interviewing some of the participants they would turn me around and hold his
bobbing head, all the while answering my interview questions.
As mentioned earlier, I noted my assumptions and possible bias in my journal.
While interviewing the participants I anticipated some of the answers based on my
own experiences. While some of the answers directly aligned with my assumptions,
others were surprising. When I asked about the impact of the terrorist attacks on their
lived experiences, I did not expect any participants to express it had no impact. I
assumed that they all must have been impacted by the attacks.
Limitations of the Study
There were several limitations for this study. Due to constraint this study
could only focus on participants 18 years and older. At first, this study intended to
focus on middle school aged students. However, obtaining permission from the
schools was extremely difficult due to the sensitive nature of the study. Despite
multiple attempts to contact the schools to allow for the study to take place in their
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establishments they simply refused to respond to my requests. When I contacted one
of the schools directly the secretary told me that to not insist any further and to not be
surprised if they were not responding given the nature of the topic and the
unwillingness to speak about it.
Secondly, the possible sample within the area was limited. As previously
stated, due to the nature of the topic, recruiting participants was not an easy task.
Potential participants at first expressed interest in being interviewed but quickly
withdrew when we talked about religion. Then, due to the very targeted area where
the interviews were conducted and the fact that a lot of the participants had a fiche S
maintaining confidentiality was a limitation. Participants were given a random
pseudonym. The descriptions of the participants were not an in-depth description.
Their ethnic background was included; an age range was provided. More specific
details were not shared. As well the topic of radicalization was not part of the
discussion. Participants were willing to discuss certain subject matters but would not
go further on the topic of radicalization.
Another limitation for this research was the time requirements and
constraints. I had a very limited time in France and had to conduct the interviews
over one day. I could only conduct one interview due to time constraints. Participants
were not willing to talk about this topic more than one time.
Due to time constraints, it happened that all participants interviewed were
males whereas I had intended to also interview female participants, but it did not
happen. While it was a hard and sensitive topic to discuss, all participants thanked me
for the opportunity to have their voices heard and to be able to speak freely on the
topic. Their voices were recorded but to protect anonymity no names were attached to
the recordings.
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Suggestions for Future Research
This study sample was relatively small with respect to size and with respect to
the participants background and gender. It would be beneficial to include Muslim
women to future studies on that specific topic. More specifically it would be
interesting to include Muslim women who wear the hijab as their experiences is
unique. A study specifically focusing on Arab Muslim would also be a good research
topic as only one accepted to participate in the study. Given that the Kouachi brothers
were Arabs they could offer a unique perspective as well.
In addition, conducting research over a longer period and do follow up
interviews would deepen the understanding of Muslim youth’s identity. In this study
French educational policies were examined. A study solely focusing on the
implementation of those policies in the classroom and the effectiveness of the
provided tools would be a much-needed study.
Conclusion
This study looked at the identity negotiation of Muslim youth in the aftermath
of the Charlie Hebdo attacks in the 19th arrondissement. In a context of anti-Muslim
sentiments, Muslims’ identity is under a microscope and the topic of heated
discussions in the media, on the political stage and among the general population.
Muslim youth claim multiple identities. They proudly claim their French, Muslim,
and Ethnic identity. They understand the concept of laïcité that was taught at school,
as respect for all beliefs, as long as they respect the laws of the Republic. Therefore,
claiming their ethnic and above all their religious identity should not be incompatible
with laïcité if laïcité is to be understood as part of the acculturative process. However,
participants found that Laïcité was more a part of a process of assimilation and French
universalism, which requires them to only claim their French identity. This creates a
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conflict leading to feelings of not fully belonging and not being given full
opportunities to be part of the French society.
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APPENDIX A

Recruitment Screener

Have you ever attended a school in the 19th arrondissement?
Yes - Accept
No - Reject
Are you 18 and above?
Yes- Accept
No- Reject
What is your religion?
Christian- Reject
Jewish- Reject
Muslim- Accept
Buddhist-Reject
Other- Reject
Are your parents or grandparents from the Maghreb or Sub-Saharan Africa?
Yes- Accept
No-Reject

Are you a French citizen?
Yes- Accept
No- Reject
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APPENDIX B
Interview Questions
Identity
• Do you identify and position yourself as a (parent ethnicity i.e Algerian,
Moroccan, Tunisian etc), French, in-between or both? Have you always
identified yourself like this or did it change after the terrorist attack?
• How closely do you identify with and affiliate with your culture?
• What is the impact of the French cultural encounter on your Muslim identity?
• Which culture do you identify with more?
• How do you understand the surrounding culture and society around you, and
are you
considered as a foreigner ‘?
• What are the factors that make you identify yourself as (parent ethnicity),
French, or in between? And does that have a relationship with being a French
citizen?
• In terms of your background, how do you usually describe yourself to people
outside your community?
• Sometimes people describe themselves somewhat differently to members of
their own community. How do you describe yourself to them?
• Which part of your background do you feel closest to? Sometimes this varies,
depending on what aspect of your life we are talking about. What about at
home? Or at work? Or with friends?
• Does your life as one of the descendants of an African immigrant from France
create a hybrid (mix between two cultures) and diaspora (the dispersion of any
people from their original homeland) identity?
• Oftentimes we hear about integration of young Muslim into French society
even if they were born in France. Is the successful “integration” in the French
society a reason behind the loss or negation of the Muslim/ African origin
identity of some Muslim youth (the oreo effect)? What are the reasons for
wanting to assimilate? (better job? a more anonymous life? distancing oneself
from the negative action of the terrorist? etc?)
• Do you think that keeping the (parent ethnicity) identity is an opposition to the
French culture, or it is self-determination?
• Does naming Muslim children in Muslim or Parent origin names protect the
Muslim (or parent ethnicity) identity in France?
• Do you feel as a unique person, or do you think that you belong to a particular
ethnic group?
• Do you have any wish to go live in your parent’s birth country?
• Do you feel that people see you as French or do you feel that they see you as
other (parent ethnicity).?
Laïcité
•
•
•
•
•

Can you define laïcité?
What did you learn about laïcité at school?
Is laïcité compatible with being a Muslim in France?
What do you think about getting rid of substitute meal in schools?
How important is religion to you? Why?

172

Terrorism
• Since the attack did you experience any difficulties related to your
background, such as discrimination, stereotyping, or being misunderstood?
How so?
• Since the attack have you felt excluded based on your culture or religion? How
so?
• What did you think about the attack of January 2015? Do you understand the
motivation of the terrorists? Do you sympathize?
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